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(Re-)Building Coalitions
The Role and Potential of Member States in Shaping the Future 
of the EU
Edited by Josef Janning and Almut Möller
With contributions by Tuomas Iso-Markku, Josef  Janning, Juha Jokela, Katherine Meenan, 
Stefano Milia, Almut Möller, Roderick Parkes, Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer, Guido Tiemann, and 
Paweł Tokarski.
Summary
Reforming the EU is hardly possible without coalitions of  “builders” – member 
states willing and able to engage in sustainable coalition building at EU level. Since 
2008, the EU and its members have found themselves in the middle of  yet another 
formative phase. Will member states eventually succeed in shaping a Union able 
to guarantee the prosperity, security, and freedom of  its citizens? This publication 
explores new patterns of  member state interaction that emerged during recent 
crises and proposes ideas for strengthening coalition building at the EU level to 
encourage a sustained effort for EU reform by policymakers across Europe.
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(Re-)Building Coalitions
The Role and Potential of Member States in Shaping the Future  
of the EU
Edited by Josef Janning and Almut Möller
With contributions by Tuomas Iso-Markku, Josef Janning, Juha Jokela, Katherine 
Meenan, Stefano Milia, Almut Möller, Roderick Parkes, Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer, Guido 
Tiemann, and Paweł Tokarski .
Introduction
In European Union governance, interaction of  
member states is crucial. Consensus and compro-
mise is often driven by coalitions of  engaged and/
or ambitious member states seeking to enhance the 
EU’s response to internal and external challenges, 
to adapt its institutions, and to shape the policy 
process. Adapting and reforming the EU would 
hardly be possible without a coalition of  “builders.”
The EU and its members find themselves in the 
middle of  yet another formative phase. What kind 
of  reforms do member states need to keep afloat 
in the twenty-first century? How important is the 
EU level in this reform process? And, finally, how 
can economic and social reforms be organized 
jointly at that level? Coalition building in this 
regard is perhaps more needed than ever. But does 
it still work, and, more importantly, how does it 
work in today’s European Union?
Certainly, coalition building seems to be more 
complicated today than it was in the past. EU 
membership has greatly enlarged, and the rules of  
the Lisbon Treaty have been in place since 2009. 
European capitals, moreover, introduced substantial 
changes into their policy agendas in response to the 
banking crisis that started to unfold in 2008. These 
factors have contributed to weakening traditional 
patterns of  member state interaction, increasing 
heterogeneity, and putting mutual trust to the test. 
In the course of  the crisis, domestic constituencies 
have been brought in, and the EU’s institutions 
have become more politicized. In short, govern-
ments are still adapting to this new environment 
for EU policymaking.
Strengthening EU politics and institutions requires 
a critical mass of  political will, which in turn 
requires a conscious and sustained effort by poli-
cymakers across Europe. At the same time, trust 
even among longstanding partners such as France 
and Germany seems to be at a low. So, will mem-
ber states succeed in building coalitions to shape 
a Union able to respond to the current and future 
demands of  its citizens?
The Alfred von Oppenheim Center for European 
Policy Studies at the German Council on Foreign 
Relations (DGAP) and the Berlin Office of  the 
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) 
brought together a group of  policy planners and 
colleagues from think tanks in Europe in June 2014 
to discuss this. The aims of  the seminar were to 
reflect on the present situation, to gain a better 
understanding of  the role, nature, and relevance 
of  member state interaction at this formative time 
for European integration, and to discuss strategic 
approaches to coalition building.
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We asked workshop participants to consider the 
following questions:
1. Are there currently active coalitions of  mem-
ber states in the EU (in the sense of  continu-
ous cooperation centered on sustained shared 
preferences rather than temporary, single policy 
issues)? If  so, which member states are coop-
erating in this way, and why and to what end to 
they form coalitions?
2. In past stages of  the integration process, mem-
ber states could generally be characterized as 
either integration drivers/builders, as veto 
actors, or as bystanders. Do these categories still 
apply? Do other labels make more sense?
3. What are your country’s main motives for 
engaging in coalition building? With whom? 
Which member state would have to be part of  
a coalition with your country, and which mem-
bers should not be included?
4. How do you assess the role of  Germany in 
coalition building?
5. In terms of  approach to the EU and general 
preferences, where do you see the main fault 
lines within the EU-28?
6. From the perspective of  domestic politics, to 
what extent do the results of  the May 2014 
European elections impact the ability and will-
ingness of  individual governments to engage in 
and to commit to coalition building?
The eight essays in this compilation were submit-
ted after the workshop and reflect the views of  our 
European colleagues on these and other questions 
as of  August 2014. The authors looked at coalition 
building from various angles: Josef  Janning and  
Yann -Sven Rittelmeyer approach coalition building 
through history and integration theory, comparing 
past practices with the present situation. Stefano 
Milia and Paweł Tokarski focus on analyzing how 
EU dynamics have changed in the course of  the 
ongoing economic crisis. Most of  the papers 
include analysis of  particular member states or 
groups of  member states: the “Big-3” of  France, 
the United Kingdom, and Germany (Roderick 
Parkes); France and Italy with regard to future 
eurozone governance (Paweł Tokarski); France and 
Germany (Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer); Ireland and the 
UK (Katherine Meenan); Italy (Stefano Milia); and Fin-
land and the Nordic countries (Tuomas Iso-Markku 
and Juha Jokela). Colleagues also emphasized the 
new dynamics in member state interaction within 
the post-Lisbon Treaty European Parliament, in 
particular Guido Tiemann, who sheds light on how 
member states interact in both of  the EU’s legisla-
tive bodies. In the last chapter, Almut Möller reviews 
the main findings of  the compilation and maps out 
current trends in member state interaction.
Discussions during the workshop clearly widened 
our understanding of  the inner logic, drivers, and 
aims of  coalition building in today’s EU. As the 
Union moves forward with the new political cycle 
that began in autumn 2014 with a fresh European 
Commission and European Parliament, we hope 
that this compilation will also be useful for policy-
makers in EU capitals.
We warmly thank our colleagues for sharing their 
incisive analyses. Our thanks, too, to Julian Rappold 
for his logistical and editorial support, Sabine Wolf  
and Miranda Robbins for their diligent copyediting, 
and the Stiftung Mercator for generously support-
ing the workshop and this publication.
Josef  Janning and Almut Möller 
Berlin, October 2014
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Member states matter greatly in European policy-
making. In their bodies – the European Council 
and the Council of  Ministers – member state 
governments define strategic priorities, launch ini-
tiatives, and shape the institutional setting of  the 
EU; they act as co-legislature, and not least (though 
almost invisibly), they guide the European Com-
mission’s work through the many consultative pro-
cesses of  comitology.
Because of  this, what matters even more than the 
member states themselves is the interaction of  
member states within and beyond the EU insti-
tutions: the patterns of  cooperation, ad-hoc, or 
sectorial coalitions vis-à-vis longer-term coalitions 
across policy areas (groupings such as the Nordic 
states, the Visegrad Group, and the Weimar Tri-
angle, and high-impact partnerships such as the 
Franco-German cooperation). Motives for build-
ing coalitions differ, from leadership ambitions to 
shared interests and policy preferences, from geo-
graphic proximity to personal ties between leaders, 
from sympathetic political cultures to compatible 
bureaucracies.
From its beginnings, European integration has 
been shaped by coalition structures. At the core 
of  the original European Economic Community 
stood the Franco-German entente, which also rein-
forced an obvious but otherwise unlikely coalition 
of  three smaller member states: Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands. This became evident 
when, with the first Northern enlargement, Dutch 
European policies won two more very like-minded 
member states: the UK and Denmark. Successive 
enlargements further diffused the original setting; 
Europe saw the rise of  a “founding members 
coalition,” which became essential for institutional 
reform in the 1980s and started to disintegrate 
toward the end of  the century. Other coalitions 
such as the Franco-German tandem have remained 
in place, but their impact was challenged once the 
EU expanded beyond 15 members in the early 
2000s.
It seems that as a consequence of  the multiplica-
tion of  EU members from 15 to 25 members in 
less than a decade, and the expansion by three 
more members by 2014, the role of  coalitions has 
given way to more ad-hoc interaction alongside a 
more national approach among member state gov-
ernments. The resulting fragmentation appears to 
have strengthened the trend toward case-by-case 
blocking coalitions and increased veto-action by 
large member states. On the flipside of  this trend, 
predictability, continuity, and commitment to the 
“Community approach” have been lost.
In the current EU-28, three major developments 
shape member state interaction:
1. The Lisbon Effect
 When the Lisbon Treaty upgraded the Euro-
pean Council of  heads of  state and government 
to a formal EU institution, the enhanced role 
of  member states became clear. Since then – 
further driven by the ongoing debt crisis – the 
European Council has taken on an ever more 
active role, extending well beyond the tasks of  
overall guidance and longer-term strategy. De 
facto, the chiefs of  governments have devel-
oped a practice of  initiative; on major policy 
issues such as Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU), this initiative matches the power of  
initiative held by the European Commission. At 
the same time, the European Council’s delib-
erations have become more complicated. The 
chiefs feel stronger domestic pressure to deliver, 
and their room for manoeuver is constrained 
by their role in national politics as well as by 
the high level of  media attention directed at the 
European Council, which overshadows cover-
age of  the other EU institutions.
 An equally profound change has occurred 
through treaty reform regarding the role of  the 
European Parliament and the political party 
formations on the European level, the Spitzen-
kandidaten revolution being its most obvious 
Building Coalitions within the European Union
Josef Janning
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expression. Divisions and alliances among 
national parties within these formations as well 
as patterns of  cooperation within and among 
factions in the EP now form a new layer of  
coalition building in the EU.
2. Unprecedented Diversity
 At no time in the history of  the EU have mem-
ber states been more heterogeneous in their 
economic strength, political culture, level of  
social security, or quality of  governance. This 
makes for a much wider range of  interests and 
preferences regarding the EU’s policies and 
institutions. Quite a few member states – such 
as the UK, Hungary, Poland, and Italy – also 
seem to be seeking a new role for themselves 
and repositioning their political place within the 
Union. Consensus about the long-term trajec-
tory of  the integration process has probably 
never been lower than it is today. Political vola-
tility has grown significantly in many member 
states; party structures have been transformed 
not only in Central and Eastern European 
countries but also in many of  the “old” mem-
ber states as well. Political stability and continu-
ity of  governments is lower in today’s Europe, 
which makes longer-term coalition building 
more complicated insofar as they are aided by 
personal relationships and shared values.
3. Broken Traditions
 In the current political habitat of  the EU, tradi-
tional structures of  steady cooperation among 
member states have withered away. The Franco-
German couple is relatively less significant, 
which in turn has reduced the scope and depth 
of  that bilateral relationship. While formal 
interaction between the two countries remains 
quite dense, the substantive output for Europe 
has decreased – even though the debt crisis has 
brought the rationale of  the relationship back 
to the surface. Over the years, France and Ger-
many have differed on many policy issues. They 
stood for different approaches to economic, fis-
cal and social policy, and their differences repre-
sented a crucial fault line – but they were none-
theless determined to bridge these gaps and 
thus to prescribe a wider compromise among 
member states. This division still exists within 
the eurozone, but it is here that the couple’s 
reduced impact has become most obvious in 
recent years.
 Longstanding consensus groups such as the 
founding members no longer shape the EU. 
This has to do with several factors. The wider 
range of  member states now make other 
options possible; Belgium is preoccupied 
domestically with preventing the country’s disin-
tegration; Italy is just emerging from the Berlus-
coni years; and a number of  other larger mem-
ber states (such as Spain and, more recently, 
Poland) are positioning themselves at the center 
of  EU bargaining.
 Alongside this, influential issue groups – such as 
the “free traders,” the farm and fish lobby, the 
environment and consumer protection group, 
and the group of  progressive welfare states – 
have mostly disappeared or lost in relevance. 
In general, empirical data shows the relevant 
impact these groupings still possess is to mobi-
lize against change. As the EU summit of  Nice 
in 2000 demonstrated, the focus on qualified 
majority voting (QMV) reform has been turned 
upside down. The original concern – preserving 
attainable majority coalitions – was replaced by 
a concern with securing blocking minority posi-
tions or veto coalitions. This continues to shape 
the views of  governments to this day.
Taken together, these structural changes contribute 
to a general preference among governments to 
pursue a European policy based on self-interest 
and focused on particular issues. Package deals 
as one pattern of  coalition building have receded. 
The interest among member states in preserving 
or nourishing a particular milieu of  interaction 
has declined. Compared to reform debates of  the 
1990s, a climate change has occurred in European 
integration.
The political dynamic of  coalitions has always been 
influenced by the roles and political strategies of  
large member states – the UK, France, and Ger-
many in particular. Berlin’s approach has been of  
special relevance in this regard. After all, West Ger-
many had been a principal architect of  coalitions 
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and, among the large member states, the one most 
active in seeking to align other members on both 
policy and institutional issues. As this approach 
was partly intended to compensate for West Ger-
many’s junior role in the Franco-German couple, 
it only receded with German unification in 1990 
and reunification’s implications for domestic policy. 
Subsequently, German leadership in coalition build-
ing further diminished as a consequence of  Ger-
many’s pivotal role in the eurozone, in debt crisis 
management, and Berlin’s approach of  “leading 
by denial.” Seeking consensus – or followers – on 
key issues still played a significant role, but the pro-
cesses by which this was achieved now appeared 
to follow the law of  gravity rather than the time-
honored rules of  forging compromise.
The fate of  coalition building within the EU could 
perhaps be left to academics if  the view that pre-
vailed today among member states were that inte-
gration is now largely complete, that its inherent 
dynamics are reliably strong, and that member state 
interests are best served by maintaining the sta-
tus quo. But integration is widely seen as needing 
readjustment and reform, deepening and widening, 
and the status quo is seen either as not delivering 
enough output or delivering too much of  it. In 
short, coalitions still matter strategically.
The current state of  the Union suggests the latter. 
Therefore, whenever the EU’s capacity to act turns 
out to be insufficient – be it for lack of  legitimacy 
or competence, for institutional inefficiency or 
because of  deadlock over crucial decisions – the 
key questions of  coalition building return: How 
to get things done? How to build critical mass to 
eventually secure a qualified majority or to lay the 
groundwork for consensus? Which members are 
ready to engage as builders, which ones stand by 
and will need to be won over, and if  so, through 
which concessions? Who will be veto players, and 
what is their potential for joining coalitions?
In response to such questions, the patterns of  
interests, goals, domestic politics, bureaucratic 
cultures, and not least of  chemistry among lead-
ers, governments and political parties will shape 
European policy. The choice between ad-hoc 
arrangements and more reliable informal or formal 
coalitions therefore remains a strategic issue in 
European affairs.
DGAPanalyse 20 | December 2014
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It is common that when deep changes occur in the 
European Union, member states return to center 
stage. This usually happens when EU treaties are 
renegotiated. Indeed, the last time coalitions within 
the EU were subject to intense debate and schol-
arly attention was ten years ago, when the Con-
vention on the future of  Europe was conducting 
its work and the EU was about to enlarge toward 
Central and Eastern Europe.1 This debate was also 
related to the United Kingdom’s participation in 
several trilateral meetings with France and Ger-
many – meetings that raised fears in other member 
states about a directorate of  the “Big-3.”
Observations focusing on grand bargains and 
emphasizing the role of  member states do echo the 
Moravcsikian way of  thinking: national preferences 
are formed as the first step of  the decision-making 
process, after which intergovernmental negotiations 
can take place. For these negotiations, coalitions are 
an essential instrument, determining in large parts 
the subsequent institutional choices and rational 
procedures.
The last years have shown that member states 
tend to take back the reins of  power, particularly 
when deep crises require fundamental changes to 
the Union to protect the future of  the European 
project as such. What, then, has been the impact of  
crises on coalition building between member states 
in the past, and how can it be assessed today?
Member States and EU Crises
The European system has often encountered dif-
ficulties in reacting to emergencies. This has been 
observed especially on security and defense issues 
where the alleged “soft power” of  the EU meant that 
its crisis management was seen as weak and ineffec-
tive, and the institutional innovations introduced by 
the Lisbon Treaty may not have been able to improve 
the situation considerably.2 The EU’s responses to the 
financial and sovereign debt crises that arose during 
the last years have also proved to be generally too 
slow and insufficient.3 In such cases, national lead-
ers usually take the driver’s seat and negotiate with 
each other in order to reach a consensus as quickly 
as possible. Subsequently they turn to the European 
Commission and the European Parliament, which up 
till this point have found themselves in the back seat. 
The European Commission has often played a pri-
mary role in driving forward the integration process, 
but in these cases, it is merely a partner, or even an 
assistant.
The role of  member states as one of  the pillars and 
source of  legitimacy of  the EU has never been funda-
mentally questioned. However, national governments 
tend to be more discrete in asserting themselves 
in “calm periods” of  less strategic relevance. During 
such times, the EU business is primarily conducted 
by other EU institutions, while the heads of  state or 
government in the European Council stay only at the 
margins of  the decision-making process or merely 
supervise it. Spillover effects and functionalist read-
ings of  European integration have contributed to 
hiding this reality. However, the heads of  state or gov-
ernment gathered in the European Council have the 
ability to quickly return to a position of  influence not 
only in the Council of  the European Union – often 
considered as the “lower level” of  the European 
Council, despite the numerous differences in form 
and role between these two institutions – but also in 
the whole EU decision-making triangle.
Since 2008–09, the beginning of  the economic and 
financial crises that quickly led to social, political, and 
confidence crises, the European Council has once 
again concentrated much of  the decision making.
There has been a steady increase in majority vot-
ing in the EU over time. With this, coalitions have 
become more and more important, directly affect-
ing member states’ interaction within the European 
Council. The Lisbon Treaty lists a number of  cases 
in which the European Council can decide upon 
the majority or qualified majority rule. Neverthe-
less, the main rule for the European Council is still 
to decide by consensus, and this strong practice 
has until now not been undermined by the legal 
A Usual Business Fostered by Crises
Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer
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prescriptions. The European Council has so far 
only twice taken a formal vote: in 1985, when the 
Italian Council presidency decided to convoke an 
intergovernmental conference to kick off  the first 
fundamental overhaul of  the founding treaties, and 
in 1987 on the so-called “Delors 1 Package.” Since 
then, the call for a formal vote has mostly been 
used as a threat, for example during Germany’s 
Council presidency in June 2007 to counter the 
then Polish leadership and help the Lisbon Treaty 
see the light of  the day, or most recently, in the 
decision to nominate Jean-Claude Juncker as the 
next president of  the European Commission. The 
possibility of  resorting to a vote and then gather-
ing a sufficient majority in favor of  his candidacy 
played an important role in tempering the initial 
opposition of  British Prime Minister David Cam-
eron. In such power games where votes usually do 
not take place but can be used as a last resort, the 
art of  coalition building is essential.
This is especially true because coalitions between 
EU member states are not classical interstate coali-
tions; they are deeply impacted by the institutional 
setting into which Union members are embedded. 
Defining the Member State as a “distinctive kind 
of  state where national power is exercised in con-
cert with others” implies recognizing the nearly 
automatic nature of  coalition building within the 
EU.4 In this sense, building coalitions consists of  
countries privileging some partners over others 
in order to exercise national power and defend 
their national interests. The environment in which 
coalition building takes place is both about ritual 
and reconstruction. Due to the long history of  
the integration process and to progressive enlarge-
ments, relations between EU member states have 
a two-fold nature. On the one hand they are well 
established and well structured; on the other, they 
are subject to continual adaptation.
Between Institutionalized and Ad hoc 
Coalitions
In organizations as institutionalized as the EU, 
coalitions are often perceived as structured groups. 
Structures may help to reinforce coalitions and to 
avoid fluctuations caused by changes of  personnel 
– and personalities. However, coalitions remain by 
definition temporary alliances that are negotiated 
among their participants. In fact, in the EU, both 
forms coexist.
There are coalition groupings that even existed 
before the EU, such as the Benelux countries or 
the Nordic Council. France and Germany have set 
an example of  a highly institutionalized coalition. 
Over the years, other less entangled coalitions like 
the Visegrad Group or the Weimar Triangle (both 
launched in 1991) have been built, following a simi-
lar logic of  coordinating positions ahead of  EU 
negotiations. The Weimar Triangle can be consid-
ered an evolution of  the Franco-German tandem, 
which occasionally welcomes Poland – deemed a 
new strategic partner in the aftermath of  the fall of  
the Soviet Union– to join their discussions. In the 
Visegrad Group, however, Poland plays a leading 
rather than a secondary role. The Visegrad Group’s 
main objective was to pursue the “full involvement 
[of  its members] in the European political and eco-
nomic system, as well as the system of  security and 
legislation.”5 When these states finally joined the 
EU in 2004, they adapted the nature of  their coop-
eration, asserting their determination “to jointly 
contribut[e] to the fulfillment of  the European 
Union’s common goals and objectives and to the 
successful continuation of  the European integra-
tion.”6 The underlying idea is to coordinate closely 
in order to defend specific common regional inter-
ests but also to increase their power as individual 
states within the EU.
France and Germany’s coalition relies on a number 
of  core elements. First and foremost among these 
is their turbulent common history, followed by 
their status as founding EU members, their geog-
raphy, and their respective economic and political 
power. The strength of  this coalition stems from 
its subtle mix of  cooperation and tension, or bet-
ter said, from the ability of  successive French and 
German governments to overcome their differ-
ences in order to cooperate in a way that allows 
other EU members to follow Franco-German 
positions. Personal chemistry matters even within a 
format as well organized as Franco-German coop-
eration. The most effective times of  cooperation 
have been associated to pairs of  leaders who were 
able to develop a particularly good relationship. At 
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the same time, however, the coalition is institu-
tionalized enough to be able to function in times 
of  diverging political orientation and policy prefer-
ences as well. Lately, however, the pair’s effective-
ness has been affected by opposing economical 
responses to the crisis.
During the French 2012 presidential campaign, the 
frequent references to Germany – especially the 
question of  whether to criticize it or to hail it as an 
example – underlined the fact that the relationship 
had been normalized. Although the coalition’s solid 
base, deeply rooted in its special history, prevents a 
long-term disruption of  its work, it is hampered by 
growing politicization (which peaked with Angela 
Merkel’s political support of  Nicolas Sarkozy in the 
2012 elections and François Hollande’s presence as 
guest of  honor at the SPD Congress in November 
2011). This development could lead to a two-speed 
Franco-German coalition: when political views 
happen to diverge, the relationship still manages 
to function in a lower gear, thanks to the various 
institutional mechanisms that are in place; when 
positions of  leaders come closer to each other, 
relations shift into a higher gear. After the 2013 
German general elections, the French socialist lead-
ership welcomed the SPD’s inclusion in the govern-
ing coalition, and SPD ministers are often consid-
ered allies in bending the positions of  Chancellor 
Merkel’s party on economic and financial matters.
Coalitions between member states are therefore 
also power games in which several means may be 
used to bring the partner in the desired direction. 
In an EU of  28 member states, the preferences of  
each country are logically much more diverse than 
they were in the original community, which was 
almost five times smaller. Nevertheless, as demon-
strated by quantitative studies7 analyzing member 
states attitudes in Council voting, the arrival of  ten 
newcomers in 2004 did not lead to important dif-
ficulties and the slowdown of  the decision-making 
process. This can be explained by several factors: 
the development of  efficient working groups, 
informal conciliation circles, and new or improved 
process. In addition, the evolution of  rules with the 
successive adoption of  new treaties since the Euro-
pean Single Act continuously decreased the number 
of  decisions that needed to be made unanimously 
and increased the amount of  majority, or qualified 
majority, voting. Such a system is an incentive for 
member states to engage in coalition building, and, 
accordingly, member states have enhanced their 
coalition practices both in formal and ad hoc ways. 
Institutionalized structured coalitions have grown 
both in numbers and density of  cooperation, and 
ad hoc coalitions seem to be used more intensively. 
The numerous talks or restricted meetings preced-
ing European summits are an obvious example of  
this. Similarly, the regular European party meetings 
permanently offer an opportunity to establish coali-
tions based on political affinities.
Ad hoc coalitions, then, remain very much depen-
dent on events and are thus volatile by nature. 
Here, not only the respective domestic context 
matters but the EU context does too. For example, 
the 2014 European elections affected the coali-
tion building capacities of  member states to the 
extent that they partially changed the respective 
power of  the member states in the EU context. 
Their concrete power in the European Parliament 
(EP) is linked to the number of  representatives 
but also to their personal experience and influ-
ence, to their numbers in the main political groups, 
and to their ability to obtain certain positions. As 
a consequence, each member state’s real power 
in the EP varies with the results. The recent rise 
of  Euroskeptic MEPs deeply affected the influ-
ence of  some member states in the EP due its 
strong tendency to adopt texts through an agree-
ment between its two main political groups. With 
the number reached for the new legislature, such 
“grand coalition” agreements may even become 
a rule. France is certainly the country most badly 
hit by this situation; almost one third of  its repre-
sentatives come from the far-right Front National 
(which, however, did not manage to form its own 
political group). Consequently, its representation in 
the two main parliamentary groups – the European 
People’s Party and the Socialists & Democrats – is 
very low.
Simultaneously, the May 2014 election results also 
affected how the power of  a national leader is 
perceived domestically and elsewhere in the Union. 
Elections, both national and European, are thus 
cyclical elements that shape the coalition poten-
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tial of  member states. By finishing third with less 
than 14 percent of  the votes, the Socialist party 
of  President Hollande suffered a heavy defeat that 
reduced his influence domestically but also at EU 
level. Conversely, in Italy, Matteo Renzi, who took 
office a few months before the European elections, 
suddenly appeared to many as a useful ally since he 
won the largest contingent of  seats in the Socialists 
& Democrats group in the EP. In Germany, the 
election results supported the coalition that had 
been in place since December 2013 and reinforced 
Germany’s first-rank position in the EU.
Germany’s Special Role in the Coalition 
System – with France’s Support
Germany today is probably in one of  the most dif-
ficult positions it has been in since the early days 
of  the European project. For the moment, there 
is such a gap between Germany’s power and the 
respective power of  its EU partners (given their 
internal weaknesses and Germany’s healthy econ-
omy) that it seems hard to conceive any coalition 
without Germany that could wield real influence 
in the EU. This unbalanced situation automatically 
affects the idealistic principle of  equality between 
member states on which the Union is built.8 The 
government in Berlin should evaluate its options 
in coalition building now in order not to become a 
burden rather than a blessing to coalition building.
For the time being, perhaps Germany should either 
be part of  all coalitions or avoid engaging explicitly 
in any. Serving actively as an honest broker – a role 
that fits well with the way the country has seen 
itself  in the past – could be preferable. This would 
imply that Germany endorses a role similar to 
the one of  the rotating presidency of  the Council 
of  Ministers before the Lisbon Treaty came into 
force – at least as long as the crises prevail and the 
situation remains as imbalanced as it does today. 
This means primarily serving as a neutral mediator 
ensuring the good functioning and efficiency of  
the Union and the progress of  political integration. 
But such a role also allows Germany to influence 
some decisions according to its own preferences. 
The balancing act is to keep just enough prestige to 
exercise such a responsibility.
There is, however, an obvious tension between this 
stance and Germany’s more recent, interest-driven 
Europapolitik. But at a time where coalitions are 
often “defensive” coalitions, aiming at stopping the 
integration process or even reversing it, and where 
builders of  integration have become an endan-
gered species, this role of  a driver and facilitator is 
more than required. Furthermore, if  the situation 
continues to deteriorate, Germany might face the 
dilemma of  defending either its own preferences 
or defending the EU, which is of  course also one 
of  its top priorities and very much in its interest. 
Its relationship with France might be very useful in 
this regard, as Paris could help legitimize this role 
and provide the backing of  some other member 
states.
Germany could also contribute to fostering a 
necessary proper articulation between institution-
alized and ad hoc coalitions by acting as a bridge 
between both. This is of  strategic interest for 
both individual member states and for a good 
functioning of  the EU decision-making system as 
such. Institutionalized coalitions are often seen as 
a basis on which broader ad hoc coalitions can be 
built. But ad hoc coalitions are equally helpful in 
stimulating institutionalized coalitions by creating 
tension between the states in an established struc-
tured coalition and thus forcing them afterward to 
narrow their respective positions. In playing such 
a bridging role, Germany would still be able to 
defend its own interests but could do so less explic-
itly than its partners.
This looks like a complex task for a state looking 
for the right balance and position between its his-
tory and the will to act and be treated as a “normal” 
EU State, between its power and its will to respect 
the positions of  other member states, and between 
requests by others to assume a more active role and 
the temptation to hold back and avoid criticism. 
However, in order to save the clout of  the Franco-
German couple well beyond the crises years, such 
a choice would surely pay off  for Germany in the 
longer term.
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Whatever the many different interpretations that 
can be given to the results of  the May 2014 Euro-
pean elections, one can confidently say that these 
were difficult elections. They will have serious 
political repercussions in both member states and 
at European level, where they are likely to enhance 
even further the role of  the European Council at 
the center of  the European drive.
Overall, member state interaction has become 
more difficult. Growing tensions and differences of  
opinion between member states affected in differ-
ent ways by the economic crisis have led to a situ-
ation in which both the European Council and the 
Council of  Ministers find it increasingly difficult to 
act. Both these intergovernmental institutions face 
an even stronger than usual risk of  accepting low-
level compromises. This opens up opportunities for 
stronger responsibilities of  other EU institutions, 
in particular the European Parliament, which has 
started to take on this role.
At the same time, at least two of  the major play-
ers in this current intergovernmentalist mode of  
action – France and the United Kingdom – see 
their leadership ability severely weakened. So do a 
host of  other governments, as they become more 
and more concerned with addressing their fragile 
national balances rather than launching bold initia-
tives on the future of  Europe. With French and 
English leadership called into question, the ability 
of  both countries to build coalitions within the 
wider EU has been affected. There is no doubt that 
this will impact coalition dynamics among member 
states.
In order to balance the growing clout of  member 
states in the European Council, it seemed appropri-
ate to anchor the appointment of  the new presi-
dent of  the Commission to the will of  the voters 
in the May 2014 European elections. This is not-
withstanding all the limitations and contradictions 
that can be found in the new Spitzenkandidaten 
method. However, the election results and the de 
facto political weight the procedure created9 for the 
Commission president suggest that the role of  the 
European Commission was further limited rather 
than strengthened, while the influence of  the Euro-
pean Parliament will continue to grow.
European Party Politics
This new approach to bringing a new Commission 
president into office has a further and very likely 
consequence: in determining such choices in the 
future, it will be increasingly necessary to weigh 
the positions and the internal and external alli-
ances of  the various European political families on 
future legislative and constitutional matters. This is 
particularly relevant for the three groups that com-
mitted to supporting the new Commission’s work 
in the aftermath of  the elections: the European 
People’s Party (EPP), the Progressive Alliance of  
Socialists & Democrats (PES), and the Alliance of  
Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). To 
give the new Commission continuous and adequate 
support, it will be necessary to work toward devel-
oping more robust aggregations of  parties than in 
the past. This also means that the three groups will 
have to avoid as much as possible the determina-
tion of  voting by national allegiances rather than 
political affiliations.
Although the May 2014 elections reconfirmed the 
majority of  the traditional parties in the Eighth 
European Parliament, the return of  those parties 
to the EP feels more like a non-defeat than a vic-
tory. Certainly, there is no clear mandate for their 
programs concerning future European policies. 
Electoral support for Euroskeptics in the EP more 
than doubled. Despite this, Euroskeptic forces will 
not be able to greatly affect individual legislative 
decisions – partly because they are divided among 
themselves. However their stronger presence will 
oblige pro-European parties to seek greater unity 
and determination in their action.
As perhaps never before, this situation brings to 
the fore one of  the most important truths already 
contained in the Ventotene Manifesto of  1941.10 
The European Union in Search of New Energy
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This document recognized at an early stage that the 
future dividing line between progressive and con-
servative views would run more and more between 
those who respectively want more democracy, free-
dom, or socialism within nation-states and those 
who instead commit to building a supranational 
state to achieve these ideals.
Member States Learning to Play the 
European Parliament
The result of  the European elections, when ana-
lyzed through the “parliamentary” lens above, gives 
particular responsibilities in shaping the future of  
the EU to two governments whose parties both 
performed well in the 2014 elections: Germany and 
Italy. In recent years Germany has in fact already 
exercised this role and has a decisive influence on 
the behavior of  the EPP. Italy’s new prominence 
is somewhat unexpected, but the current govern-
ment of  Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, whose party 
obtained the majority of  PES seats in the EP, was 
certainly strengthened by the European election.
It would of  course be naive to believe that Italy 
can simply step into the traditional Franco-German 
axis and shape the fundamental choices to be made 
in the Union in coming years. But we must bear 
in mind that, in the short term, France may find it 
difficult to devote itself  to major European politi-
cal issues. For the majority of  its citizens – through 
their vote or through their choice not to vote – 
clearly expressed a desire for fundamental changes 
in the way the EU is currently governed.
Coalitions Must Deliver
Even if  European policies for the next five years 
will still mainly be judged with respect to the 
Union’s ability or inability to exit the financial and 
economic crisis (output legitimacy), an increasing 
number of  signs undoubtedly indicate the need 
to improve the democratic system itself  (input 
legitimacy). In this respect, the path indicated 
by the so-called Four Presidents’ Report in June 
and December 201211 and the full realization of  
the four unions – banking, fiscal, economic, and 
political – will decisively influence future European 
decision-making capacity.
In the future, any coalition that takes the lead 
within the EU will thus need to be judged in rela-
tion to the will and the commitment of  its com-
ponent countries to actually make progress on 
that path. Having said that, it is likely that within 
the wider Union, some states will continue to be 
less committed than others to reform, and that on 
important policy areas such as energy, defense and 
even immigration, parallel dynamics with very dif-
ferent alliances may develop.12
If  the overall direction is set with the Four Presi-
dents’ Report, the contentious issue nonetheless 
remains: how to implement it. For example, and 
even more so after the European elections, agree-
ment between France and Italy13 (with the support 
of  other countries, particularly those of  the Medi-
terranean) who are in favor of  greater attention 
to tools that help trigger employment and growth 
seems to be continuously developing. On this mat-
ter large differences in approach remain between 
these countries and Germany (and a number of  
other countries, mainly in the north, who also see 
budget discipline as the main remedy), but dia-
logue now seems to be more open, especially when 
it comes to creating the conditions to make the 
development of  genuinely European investment 
plans credible.14
Another element to consider for the future of  
the EU’s internal dynamics is the ever more pro-
nounced isolation, or self-exclusion, of  Britain, in 
particular from the euro debate, whose governance 
reform is seen as crucial by euro members to re-
strengthen the Union. In this sense, the final com-
muniqué of  the European Council of  June 25–26, 
201415 now appears to draw a clear line; countries 
that want to move ahead with further integration 
shall be allowed to do so, while respecting the view 
of  those who do not want to take that path.
Moving beyond Policy Reform: 
Constitutional Matters and Coalition 
Building
Any coalition ready to take all necessary steps to 
re-strengthening EMU, whatever its final composi-
tion, will sooner or later have to tackle the theme 
of  new transfers of  sovereignty and therefore the 
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reform of  the existing treaties.16 This will have to 
be organized, perhaps for the first time in Euro-
pean integration, in a context in which parallel 
proposals for re-nationalizing certain policies and 
other measures to strengthen subsidiarity have been 
made.17 So far however, only very few high-level 
politicians in Europe seem to be willing to speak 
out clearly in favor of  this matter.18 A very cautious 
attitude seems to prevail in general among govern-
ments, which usually results in the asserted need 
to first preventively check the potential scope of  
action laid down in the Lisbon Treaty. And yet, it is 
on the real possibility of  actually re-starting work 
on the EU treaties that any future coalition which 
has the sincere ambition of  reviving the European 
project will be put to the test.
In recent years, the frequent recourse to often inef-
fective ad hoc measures to deal with the various 
trouble spots of  the common currency, growth and 
competitiveness, has unfortunately often meant 
divisions and rivalries between different govern-
ments, with the re-emergence of  overt prejudice 
and even statements of  widespread hostility. In and 
vis-à-vis Germany in particular, these dynamics 
have come to play a central role. It is now neces-
sary to return to a common assessment of  the 
major achievements of  the integration process 
and explore how they can be further consolidated 
through a more legitimate and effective governance. 
This could include, at least temporarily, the identi-
fication of  a kind of  federal core that could consti-
tute the Union’s main engine.
The six-month Italian presidency of  the Council 
of  Ministers that started in July 2014 seems deter-
mined to obtain a number of  initial responses from 
its European partners on these issues. The govern-
ment in Rome invited member states to express 
their views on the way ahead for Europe by filling 
out a “Questionnaire on the Functioning of  the 
EU System.” The results are serving as a kick-off  
discussion at the European Council in December 
2014.19 (By that time, alliances in the EU for the 
reform of  its governance system are likely to have 
become more visible.)
Returning, however, to the opening reasoning, it 
will be very interesting to see which position the 
new EP intends to take on the issue of  structural 
reforms. For now there is a resolution20 passed by 
the outgoing EP urging member states to take the 
initiative as soon as possible. The Seventh Euro-
pean Parliament also gave some indications of  its 
own reform proposals, to be submitted to a new 
European Convention for further elaboration. Will 
the newly elected assembly21 find the energy to 
make this initiative topical again? Or will it instead 
be the first president of  the European Commis-
sion appointed by a more democratic procedure to 
reclaim a stimulus role that the Commission has 
been able to exercise in the past and become both 
the creator and mediator of  future coalitions? At 
present the latter seems less likely, but the incoming 
Juncker Commission looks determined to catch up 
in the institutional race for the future of  Europe.
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There are several similarities between coalition 
building in the field of  economic issues and other 
policy areas. Member states’ positions are de facto 
not equal, and their political clout depends on 
structural factors, especially size, economic per-
formance, and political stability. However, coali-
tions of  economic interests or social issues are 
usually more stable and last longer, as they are a 
clear consequence of  concrete domestic economic 
and social models that cannot be changed over-
night. These have been shaped for decades – and 
sometimes for centuries. The EU primarily has an 
economic focus, being the largest deeply integrated 
market in the world. Its single currency is used by 
18 of  the member states at present. The game of  
economic interests in the EU, played around regu-
latory issues, share of  common resources, or power 
balance between national and community institu-
tions, is usually grounded much deeper than, say, 
foreign policy questions. As a result, it is much eas-
ier to build a coalition of  Central European states 
around cohesion policy than to hammer out their 
common approach toward Russia, for example.
The question of  eurozone membership added 
some complexity to the discussion about coalitions. 
Traditional “institutionalized” geographical coali-
tions do not necessarily work anymore with regard 
to some euro area issues. For instance, Poland may 
consider the European Stability Mechanism to be 
an obstacle on the way to the euro, while Slovakia 
(so far the only eurozone member within the Viseg-
rad Group) may regard it as a costly but necessary 
tool for the stabilization of  the currency union. 
Sweden and Denmark’s different relationships with 
the euro area are reflected in the fact that the latter 
is seriously considering joining the Banking Union 
and the former is not.
The global financial crisis and the sovereign debt 
crisis have made the economic performance and 
interests inside the eurozone increasingly divergent. 
Although confidence in the euro area has increased 
considerably over the past months, none of  its 
drawbacks has been solved in a permanent way. 
The EU is still far from clearing up its problems 
with the banking sector. Several currency union 
members are trapped by major competitiveness 
problems and show little willingness for deeper 
structural reforms of  their economies. This results 
in an adverse effect on growth perspectives and 
subsequently on their fiscal situation. The ratio of  
sovereign debt to GDP is still increasing in three 
out of  the four largest eurozone economies. There-
fore it seems that the most important question 
during the current EU institutional cycle is whether 
the power struggle between the different coalitions 
of  states in the eurozone leads to a dysfunctional 
stalemate or whether it perhaps gives a chance for 
continuing the process of  its reconstruction and 
stabilization. It is only if  the latter can be achieved 
that the eurozone can ultimately be fixed.
The Potential for Franco-Italian  
Leadership …
What, then, does coalition building hold within the 
eurozone for the coming months? Interestingly, it 
is not Germany’s leadership – or lack thereof  – 
that will matter the most, but France’s and Italy’s 
attempts to regain ground. The economic, political, 
and social situations in France and Italy will have 
a decisive impact on the EU agenda in the next 
five years. If  they are not sufficiently addressed, 
the problems of  these economies sooner or later 
will affect the sustainability of  the entire currency 
union.
In Italy, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi is the only 
European leader in power whose position was 
definitely reinforced by the European Parliamen-
tary elections. With historically high support of  
40.8 percent of  votes for his party, Renzi’s stand-
ing in Brussels increased considerably, rendering 
him a valuable ally for France, the natural leader 
of  the “anti-austerity” camp. Renzi calls for a new 
Europe, with softened EU fiscal rules, an EU-wide 
large investment program, and an EU unemploy-
ment fund. The 39-year-old politician has skillfully 
positioned himself  as an alternative to Italy’s old, 
Coalition Building, Eurozone, and the New EU Political Cycle
Paweł Tokarski
DGAPanalyse 20 | December 2014
18
opportunistic political class. However, the balance 
sheet of  his six months in power does not yet 
look convincing. It is doubtful whether his reform 
program 2014–17 is a credible answer to the main 
predicaments of  the Italian economy, namely the 
over-grown, inefficient public sector, high unem-
ployment, corruption, and the shadow economy. 
Paradoxically, Renzi’s political strength in Brussels 
not only stems from the number of  his political 
supporters in Italy and abroad, but also from the 
scale of  the economic and social problems in his 
country – and his country’s systemic importance. 
Indeed, the bleak macroeconomic data from the 
first two quarters of  2014 raised skepticism in Italy 
about Renzi’s ability to deliver on his promises. 
Nevertheless, he still enjoys major popular support, 
even though the economic and social situation in 
Italy is far worse than in France and the reform 
task is much more challenging, for it will come 
with considerable political costs.
France finds itself  in a different phase of  the politi-
cal cycle. The general public lacks faith that the 
current government can meet the country’s eco-
nomic challenges. Unlike the situation in Italy, the 
European elections dealt a major blow to President 
François Hollande. In 2012 he made numerous 
promises, including painless economic revival and 
a significant decrease in unemployment, but only 
won his presidential mandate by a narrow margin. 
However, in both 2013 and 2014 Hollande failed 
to present a convincing reform program, and the 
economic recovery proved more difficult than the 
public expected. Poor macroeconomic data trig-
gered not only a government reconstruction in 
August 2014 but also made it impossible to meet 
the deadline for budget deficit cuts, set for 2015. 
This will force France to seek its extension for the 
third time. Despite the sound declarations of  the 
second government of  Manuel Valls, the successful 
implementation of  more comprehensive reforms 
before the next parliamentary and presidential vote 
in 2017 is now in question.
The difficulties of  both Hollande and Renzi to 
meet the expectations of  their electorates will 
increase the pressure of  Paris and Rome on Berlin 
and the EU institutions. Both know that the euro-
zone needs them and that they are “too big to fail.” 
Their claims have so far reached from the softening 
of  the EU deficit rules to a large investment pro-
gram on the EU level, more ECB action to support 
growth, to an increase of  government spending 
in Germany. Facing the wider situation in the EU, 
Paris and Rome feel they are likely to gain ground 
with their ideas.
… and its limitations
Due to tremendous social costs of  the crisis 
in Europe, it is indeed necessary for the EU to 
consider some mechanisms for alleviating the dif-
ficulties of  the labor markets. It could be reason-
able, for instance, to increase the budget of  the 
youth guarantee that helps graduates enter the job 
market. However, EU instruments alone will not 
be sufficient. This is where the limitations of  the 
Franco-Italian entente lie. Even if  French and Ital-
ian expectations were to be met, it is rather unlikely 
that their competitiveness problems would be per-
manently addressed. Countries such as Germany 
thus have a point in saying that there is a consider-
able risk that creating permanent EU or eurozone-
wide financial transfers would rather discourage 
governments from taking the necessary measures.
Nevertheless, the claims of  Renzi and Hollande 
have put Angela Merkel under pressure. Germany 
can be easily blamed for economic egoism and for 
not doing enough for overall growth. The anti-
austerity camp has found support among numerous 
economists from Europe and the United States, 
including Joseph Stiglitz, who criticized the Ger-
man resistance to fiscal stimulus. Similarly, IMF 
Director Christine Lagarde also criticized austerity 
policy on several occasions. What is more, France 
managed to mobilize a EU-wide coalition of  social-
ist parties, which met twice in summer 2014 shortly 
before the European Council summits and backed 
the demands of  the French-Italian duo.
The forum’s message proved to have limited reach, 
however. The Berlin-Tegel Joint Statement issued 
by three EU ministers from France, Germany and 
Italy of  July 30, 2014 may indeed signal that Berlin 
is trying to soften this “anti-austerity axis” by tend-
ing to agree to some social policy claims.22 On the 
other hand, Germany must look for allies to avoid 
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isolation. The backing of  the fourth eurozone 
economy, Spain, and the possible Eurogroup presi-
dency for Luis de Guindos, would help counterbal-
ance the Paris-Rome axis. However, the contradic-
tory interests of  the main big member states will 
at some point have to be resolved. The key ques-
tion to answer is how many structural reforms in 
France and Italy can be negotiated in exchange for 
concessions concerning EU investments and the 
extension of  the deficit deadline for France.
The difficult political situation in France, where 
support for President Hollande is low, is likely 
to have a direct impact on plans for eurozone 
reconstruction. The European Commission in its 
blueprint stated that reinforced coordination of  
economic and budgetary policies or new mecha-
nisms of  fiscal transfers would require the creation 
of  a necessary legal basis.23 At the same time, such 
a step may be difficult, as any major revision of  the 
EU treaties would trigger a referendum in France, 
with a no-vote as a very likely result. Therefore, 
these plans would have to be reconsidered. In the 
next five years, we are unlikely to witness a kind of  
Copernican Revolution in the eurozone architec-
ture; at best there will be some broad compromise 
over a mix of  different policies to support eco-
nomic growth, including some structural reforms 
at the national level, with commitments to the 
existing deficit rules. The French example shows 
that the capacity for coalition building is no longer 
a matter of  will and skill on the part of  respective 
political leaders but finds its limits in the domestic 
context. La Grande Nation is learning this lesson the 
hard way – with perhaps a less than ideal outcome 
for the Eurozone and the EU as a whole. Perhaps 
we must wait until the next eurozone crisis for a 
major reconstruction of  the euro area architecture.
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Rethinking the Role of Big State Coalitions 
in European Integration
Throughout June 2014, European governments 
held a series of  summits where they achieved little 
beyond damaging the three goals at the heart of  
the EU’s functioning: its fairness, efficiency and 
effectiveness. Disputes between France and Ger-
many prevented compromise on austerity and 
growth issues, denting prospects of  any fair new 
settlement.24 Differences between the UK and Ger-
many over the nomination of  Jean-Claude Juncker 
as Commission president set back the debate on 
the efficient functioning of  the EU.25 And dif-
ferences between France and the UK, involving 
mutual finger-pointing over the introduction of  
a new round of  sanctions against Russia, under-
mined the effective representation of  the EU’s 
interests abroad.26
These setbacks confirmed a pattern apparent for 
some years now. France, Germany, and the UK 
still have the capacity to disrupt the EU’s func-
tioning, but they no longer bring much to the 
integration process. Long gone, it seems, are the 
days when the UK and France would try to lay the 
basis for a more integrated EU defense policy, or 
when Germany and France would push forward 
passport-free travel. The euro crisis has been a 
time of  intense intergovernmentalism, bringing the 
so-called Big-3 to the fore. But not only have the 
Big-3 failed to deliver, they have also undermined 
support for the supranational institutions. Today, 
voters who have been brought up on ideals of  fair-
ness, efficiency and effectiveness can only hold up 
a template to the EU and shake their heads. And 
yet, are they – are we – looking at the contribution 
of  the Big-3 in the wrong way?
The picture of  the EU usually given in the litera-
ture – indeed by the Big-3 themselves27 – is of  
a technocratic machine aiming to achieve legal-
administrative aims in a high-minded way. In this 
version of  the Union, the Big-3 occasionally pop 
up in a bid to further one or more of  these aims, 
and more usually end up disrupting things. And yet, 
an alternative reading of  the integration process is 
possible. In this reading, the EU is not in fact this 
kind of  Kantian constitutional project occasionally 
disrupted by three large states which have yet to 
learn their place.28 It is a messy, Hobbesian geopo-
litical creature, which has the mission of  calming 
relations among these three states. It is then air-
brushed into a form more suited to our Enlighten-
ment ideals.
Start, for instance, by asking whether there is 
anything very natural about the way “fairness,” 
“efficiency” and “effectiveness” have emerged as 
the EU’s organize political principles. These three 
goals certainly sound very admirable. But why 
are, say, classic left-right divisions so secondary in 
this supposedly enlightenment polity? And why 
are overt intergovernmental divisions – such as 
those between big states and small, or rich states 
and poor, or eastern and southern – not more 
prominent?
Moreover, why have these three principles never 
been clearly defined? Or alternatively, why are there 
no real battle lines around different understandings 
of  efficiency, effectiveness, or fairness? In essence 
these principles amount to nothing more than three 
blobby packages, the result of  compromises and 
thinking that are hard to identify. The “efficiency” 
package, for example, arbitrarily fixes on institu-
tional matters and seems to contain a heavy focus 
on decentralization per se. (“The EU should be big 
on the big things, small on the small,” according to 
the outgoing Commission president José Manuel 
Barroso and his successor, Jean-Claude Juncker.29) 
“Effectiveness” seems to be principally about the 
EU’s role in the world.
To take this line of  questioning a step further: 
These three principles are still broadly accepted 
by European publics, who are accustomed to 
enlightenment-style rhetoric. And so why is it that 
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these principles have never actually conformed to 
our enlightenment ideals? At the national level, for 
example, fairness usually entails “fair play” (every-
one has a fair chance to grab common goods if  
they stick to the rules, but some may come away 
with nothing for the same reason) or “fair shares” 
(common goods are simply split proportionally). 
But the EU’s idea of  fairness – well, what is it 
exactly, and why has it been accepted uncritically 
for so long?
And finally, why do we have three of  these pack-
ages, not four or five of  them, or indeed just one?
The Dynamics behind Big-3 Relations
The easy answer is that this is simply a reflection 
of  a complex political system: it’s obvious that 
there cannot be clear political divisions between left 
and right, let alone straightforward enlightenment-
style arrangements in a multi-vector polity like the 
European Union. But what if  these patterns could 
be traced not to a general state of  complexity but 
to the purposeful management of  Big-3 relations? 
The EU is, after all, a political system that was 
established in order to put an end to war on the 
continent. European states, tired of  repetitive con-
flicts involving France, Germany, and the UK, were 
prepared to give the Big-3 a constructive problem-
solving role on the continent. If  the Big-3 are pre-
pared to be friends with each other, the logic goes, 
then the rest are prepared to live with the trio’s pre-
eminent political role.
“Fairness” is thus about France and Germany 
compromising on the distribution of  European 
resources. This bilateral compromise is expected to 
go beyond mere economic issues and clear up most 
of  the tensions in the EU relating to size (Ger-
many as protector of  small states, France as protec-
tor of  big-state politics), resource disputes (budget, 
agriculture, energy, free movement of  persons), 
and geographic balance (east-west, north-south, 
and east-south compromises). “Efficiency,” mean-
while, is about the UK and Germany fine-tuning 
the EU’s institutions. But this is not about creating 
a balance between states that want tighter legal and 
institutional integration and more skeptical states. 
This is about melding Germany’s and Britain’s 
specific constitutional understandings. Meanwhile, 
“effectiveness” is about France and the UK pooling 
their resources and asserting the EU globally.30
The reason why we have three packages thus 
becomes clear. The Big-3 are not sufficiently cohesive 
to form a big-state directoire that would lead to one 
big compromise package, but they are still sufficiently 
dominant to prevent the emergence of  rival coalitions 
of  member states around secondary issues.31 As a 
result, the Big-3 deal in three discreet bilateral formats 
with the key sources of  tension between them. This 
is perhaps clearest in the “fairness” package, where 
France and Germany tackle the historic points of  ten-
sion between them and deal with the key points of  
continental geopolitical competition: size, borders and 
population (Schengen, EU citizenship), security (coal 
and steel community, energy), and economy (EU bud-
get, free movement of  labor), typically refashioning 
them into common goods.
In the “efficiency” package, meanwhile, the UK and 
Germany live out their collective obsession with 
institutions as the solution to international problems. 
For London, EU institutions must be strong enough 
to prevent conflicts and hostile caucusing across 
the Channel, but not so strong that they cut down 
British room for manoeuver. (The reflex emphasis 
on “decentralization” thus comes from the UK.32) 
Germany, by contrast, views the institutional question 
in terms of  mutual control. It seeks access to other 
members’ institutions and, wary of  its own power, 
gives them access to its own.33 As for promoting 
“effectiveness” package in the EU, this is principally a 
case of  France and the UK patching up their compet-
itive global relationship – their differences and, even 
more so, their similarities34 – and together exercising 
their foreign policy ambitions.35
How Big-3 Bilateralism Broke Down
The relationship between the Big-3 and other 
member states has been mutually beneficial. 
Smaller states have been ready to grant the Big-3 
a pre-eminent role in the EU system, recognizing 
that they themselves are unable to form meaning-
ful coalitions and acutely aware that a failure in the 
Big-3’s relations could risk pitching the continent 
back into geopolitical strife. In return, the Big-3 
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have tried to use their exclusive bilateral formats to 
resolve broader common problems, viewing this as 
their contribution to peace and stability on the con-
tinent. And yet, the starting premise above is not 
wholly false: the Big-3’s contribution to the EU has 
been paltry of  late, and the summits of  the past 
months do show that the quid-pro-quo with other, 
smaller states is breaking down.
Why exactly? There are at least four reasons:
1. The EU’s problems got bigger, and the Big-3 got smaller. 
The economic crisis has hit each of  the Big-3 
differently, leaving each of  the three bilateral 
relationships lop-sided. As a result of  its domes-
tic woes, the UK is too wrapped up with inter-
nal constitutional problems, and France is too 
far in the doldrums economically to contribute 
much to the EU. By contrast, Germany is push-
ing ahead in both fields of  cooperation, the 
economy and institutions.36 Franco-British rela-
tions are similarly lop-sided: the UK has been 
trying to downsize its global role in response to 
economic crisis, while France is looking to pro-
file itself  internationally to make up for its eco-
nomic problems.37 This makes a common line 
on the question of  EU effectiveness particularly 
hard. And finally, of  course, the eurozone crisis 
has buried any sense of  the parity of  the three 
bilateralisms. The Franco-German tandem is 
predominate. Paris’s and Berlin’s respective rela-
tions with London are at best secondary.
2. The vultures are gathering. Previously, smaller mem-
ber states were prepared to invest in the Big-3 
relationships and to give the trio natural prece-
dence in EU politics. When rival member-state 
coalitions did pop up, they typically recognized 
the pre-eminence of  the Big-3, confining their 
own role to balancing and complementing. Not 
so any more. Italy has been exploiting difficul-
ties among the Big-3 in order to score political 
points.38 The same is true of  the supranational 
players. While Herman Van Rompuy, as chair of  
the European Council, understood his role as 
building bridges between France and Germany 
around the issue of  “fairness,” the outgoing 
high representative for foreign affairs, Catherine 
Ashton, did not succeed in building relations 
with Paris and London. Her term was character-
ized by a prickly relationship with these two key 
capitals.39 It is also clear that the emergence of  
a two-tier EU has seriously altered the rules and 
possibilities of  coalition building.
3. Serious questions of  legitimacy have arisen. When 
the memories of  perpetual European conflict 
were still fresh, it was perfectly legitimate for 
larger states to receive special attention. These 
days, attempts to explain to voters the subtle 
quid-pro-quo behind Big-3 bilateralism are 
trickier. Even the Big-3 seem to have forgot-
ten the rationale behind their pre-eminent role 
– and Berlin, Paris and London have actually 
been the ones to admit that the current work-
ings of  the EU “hardly conform to our idea 
of  good governance.”40 Moreover, voters in 
France, Germany and the UK want to know 
what they themselves get out of  their difficult 
bilateral relationships. Germans want to know 
why their government is making economic con-
cessions to France; Britons want to know why 
Germans aren’t making political concessions to 
them. This zero-sum bilateralism in turn makes 
it harder for the three governments to perform 
a constructive role toward the other 25 EU 
members.
4. The EU wants to move on. Most governments 
seem to feel that the Big-3 system has run 
its course and that it is time to try something 
new to further their common interests. Indeed, 
they probably feel the EU has reached a point 
whereby it can either have good relations among 
France, the UK, and Germany or it can have 
a workable system of  “fairness,” “efficiency,” 
and “effectiveness. The trio has become so 
inward-looking that it is no longer able to fulfill 
its broader function: solving problems. Even 
a country like Poland, which is well invested 
in Big-3 relations through the Weimar Triangle 
(the French-Polish-German format), may be 
running out of  patience. Warsaw sees Franco-
German relations as a potential source of  unfair-
ness, the heart of  a chauvinist eurozone core. 
And the UK’s semi-detachment merely exasper-
ates it further.41
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Should the Big-3 Be Saved?
European commentators are worried by what they 
see as the recent rollback in EU integration, and 
have criticized the way the supranational organs 
are being challenged by the Big-3. Their logic is 
impeccable. But this essay has offered the reverse 
perspective, and has suggested that the Big-3 in 
fact sit at the heart of  EU integration and that 
the real problem has been the challenge posed to 
their cohesion. This in turn raises the question of  
whether Big-3 cohesion is worth preserving as a 
common European good in its own right. And the 
answer is yes, probably. The growing mutual dis-
trust among London, Berlin, and Paris will other-
wise see the three lose their enthusiasm for the EU 
– with the UK peeling off  first. In short, the Big-3 
have more to give.
Moreover, while we won’t see a conflict involving 
the Big-3 if  their relations deteriorate, geopoliti-
cal tensions may nevertheless return. The UK is 
being told, for instance, that it cannot leave the 
EU because it “can’t change its geography,” and 
France, with its struggling economy, is hearing 
that “it is inevitable to be dominated by a unified 
Germany.”42 Against that background it comes as 
no surprise to hear the EU broadcasting to the 
world in the wake of  the Ukraine crisis that Brus-
sels “does not do geopolitics.” Nothing could be 
further from the truth! The EU does geopolitics in 
the truest sense, giving states a genuine choice over 
the points of  tension between them. But as this old 
self-understanding diminishes, so too does the dis-
tinction between this system and Moscow’s more 
forceful methods of  obtaining regional cooperation.
So how can the Big-3 be saved? One approach 
would be to integrate the Big-3 bilateral formats 
better into the workings of  the supranational EU. 
That would require a change of  thinking from the 
three countries themselves, particularly the UK. 
Recently, London has focused on mobilizing its 
French and German counterparts to sideline the 
recalcitrant European institutions and “reform” 
the bloc. Much more, the Big-3 should see how 
its bilateral relationships could fit with the overall 
functioning of  the EU – with the “project team” 
system in the Commission College, say, or the new 
attempts to introduce left-right competition into 
EU politics. Since each of  the Big-3 seems nervous 
about the EU’s growth of  competences, moreover, 
the trio should also see how they could take the 
weight off  the EU and play a complementary role.
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In today’s European Union, active coalitions of  
member states are absent – coalitions in the sense 
of  continued cooperation around a shared set of  
preferences and goals going beyond single policy 
issues and offering strategic leadership. Even 
groupings of  member states which have some level 
of  shared institutions such as the Nordic states, the 
Benelux countries, the Franco-German tandem, or 
the Visegrad Group, do not seem to operate jointly. 
Although some of  the groupings with shared insti-
tutions, such as the Nordics, acknowledge that they 
share information very freely, they insist on acting 
independently from each other. Rather, when new 
initiatives appear, smaller member states seem to 
seek to approach their larger partners first in order 
to analyze the political pressure behind each ini-
tiative. This helps them align their preferences in 
the following negotiations. Germany, on the other 
hand, is less likely to seek to build coalitions than 
to gently but repeatedly state its position.
It is challenging to deal in long-term strategic con-
cepts of  coalitions given the current crisis mode. 
The EU itself  is only just exiting a phase when 
staying afloat was the objective, so the absence of  
these long-term coalitions may be a reflection of  
the lack of  economic space for radical departures; 
all focus is on the short-term and the economic 
only.
Missing the Wider Picture
The results of  the May 2014 European elections, 
which saw an increase in the representation of  
Euroskeptic parties, underline the trend that coali-
tion building of  member states within the EU will 
become more difficult. Although business within 
the European Parliament is likely to continue as 
before, because the two main political parties – the 
European People’s Party (EPP) and the Social-
ists (S&D) – can still achieve a combined majority 
within the European Parliament, the rise in the 
Euroskeptic vote will certainly put additional pres-
sure on national governments and make them more 
responsive to their constituencies – potentially lim-
iting national governments’ room for manoeuver 
in coalition building. At a time when the lingering 
economic crisis makes combined action within the 
EU, and effective action by its institutions, more 
important, member state governments will need to 
show their electorates that they, individually, have 
had a series of  “wins” and that the wins have been 
achieved not jointly but by getting the better of  
the others. It seems to be part of  political life that 
while a pro-European stance is based on common 
hopes and ambitions, Euroskeptics are each Euro-
skeptic in their own way. Increased Euroskepticism 
will thus most probably impair the likelihood of  
future joint endeavors of  member states.
Indeed, one thing stands out in particular: despite 
the fact that all the EU’s founding texts speak of  
shared values – fundamental values such as respect 
for human rights and social and economic values 
– the first response of  each foreign ministry is to 
start political horse-trading, with an immediate 
focus on the text of  each dossier rather than on a 
wider picture. Nevertheless or exactly because of  
this fact, many decisions at the level of  the Coun-
cil of  Ministers, and even more at the European 
Council level, have been taken so far by consensus 
and thus without a vote. It certainly does raise 
interesting questions to note that, at the initial 
level of  negotiation, we start with 28 completely 
independent points of  view and can often end up 
with a virtual consensus. How is this consensus 
achieved? Using some of  the principles of  project 
management, perhaps the hidden ingredient is time 
– which goes some length to explain the slowness 
of  the decision-making.
There is clearly on all sides a will to achieve consen-
sus, but many of  the part mechanisms for making 
this possible have since fallen away. There seems to 
be a real change in how the Council of  Ministers 
and the European Council work, with a perceptible 
movement away from a political mode of  decision-
making that attempted to avoid any zero-sum game. 
According to this method, every member of  the 
Council would leave with something in their hand, 
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and considerable efforts were made to ensure that 
there were no winners or losers. This is certainly 
not a feature of  recent European Councils.
Equally, given the proclaimed shared values of  
the Union, there did seem to be an emphasis on 
achievement, on moving forward. Now negotia-
tions between member states appear to be based 
on the least each participant feels they can get away 
with.
Owners and Consumers of Integration
In terms of  the approach to the EU and general 
preferences, several divisions within the EU 28 are 
visible. By far the most significant one is between 
“ins” and “outs” of  the eurozone. The “pre-ins” are 
not acting as a bridge but, rather, give an impres-
sion that they operate as insiders. The response 
of  the UK government to any sense of  exclusion 
on difficult issues, and the extreme caution of  
the European Council in its utterances, indicate 
the sensitivities of  the issue for the permanent 
outs. There is every possibility that this cleavage 
will grow over time, rather than diminishing. The 
other big division is on security, in particular the 
matter of  engagement outside the territory of  the 
EU. Clearly, those EU countries that are permanent 
members of  the UN Security Council already con-
sider themselves to have a world presence, which is 
not the case for many of  the other member states. 
But although there is a split between on the one 
hand France and the United Kingdom and on the 
other hand the “rest,” the “rest” are not so divided 
in their differences, even if  some are NATO mem-
bers and others are not. It seems to be more of  a 
continuum of  engagement.
Moreover, in past stages of  the European integra-
tion process, member states could generally be 
characterized as either drivers/builders, veto actors, 
or as bystanders of  European integration. Today, 
however, it seems more appropriate to classify 
member states as “owners” vs. “consumers” of  the 
integration process. On a day-to-day basis there 
may be no difference between, for example, the 
Netherlands and Slovakia in how they respond to 
policy initiatives, but there is a residual sense of  
responsibility among the earlier member states for 
“keeping the show on the road.” An alternate classi-
fication would be between policymakers and policy 
takers.
Ireland’s Opportunities – and Woes
While it would be foolish to pretend that smaller 
countries have the same clout as large ones, this 
does not mean that smaller countries see them-
selves as “bystanders.” Rather they see themselves 
on the margin of  decision-making and must oper-
ate on that basis. At the same time though, the 
structure of  EU institutions does allow smaller 
countries to contribute, if  that is what they want. A 
number of  Irish presidencies of  the Council have 
allowed Ireland to contribute significantly: the 1990 
European Council in Dublin, which opened the 
way for German unification, and the 2004 Euro-
pean Council where the final details of  the Euro-
pean Constitution were negotiated. In addition, the 
skill of  Irish officials at the summit concluding the 
then intergovernmental conference in Nice, and the 
contribution of  former Prime Minister John Bru-
ton to the Convention of  the Future of  Europe 
have allowed Ireland to show leadership in a way 
that differs from the regular round of  negotiation.
An aspect of  coalition building in which small 
countries can also play a part is in building bridges 
to third countries. Ireland has a particular relation-
ship with the United States for a variety of  reasons: 
a history of  emigration, the size of  the Irish lobby 
in the US, the importance of  US investment in 
Ireland, and the presence of  US multi-nationals 
in Ireland. Similarly, countries such as Spain and 
Portugal have a privileged relationship with many 
countries of  Latin America, while France has its 
particular history with many parts of  Africa. None 
of  these relationships are without their problems, 
but each of  these member states brings an echo of  
the wider world to the table.
From the point of  view of  Ireland, history and 
geography have created another, however rather 
partial coalition, which can occasionally be less 
than happy. The UK’s continued reticence on many 
policy initiatives within the EU has created ongoing 
difficulties for Ireland. For instance Ireland and the 
UK have always shared a common migration area; 
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thus, the UK refusal to be part of  the Schengen 
Agreement left Ireland with no option but to stay 
outside as well. The concept of  border controls 
between the Republic of  Ireland and Northern Ire-
land is unacceptable, although Schengen member-
ship would be desirable for the Republic Ireland.
Any potential re-negotiation by the UK of  its EU 
membership would create significant problems for 
Ireland. In addition to the EU-wide problems that 
could stem from any attempt to renegotiate the 
single market, Ireland would be particularly vulner-
able because of  the proportion of  Ireland’s food 
and drink exports that go to the UK. Any refusal 
by the UK to abide by the EU rules on state aid, 
for example, could significantly affect Ireland’s abil-
ity to attract foreign direct investment. The politi-
cal impact on Northern Ireland would be a key 
concern. Given the strength of  the UK media in 
Ireland, moreover, a rancorous renegotiation could 
have an impact on Irish public opinion. But the 
overall understanding of  European integration in 
Ireland and the UK is very different. Ireland’s deci-
sion to join the eurozone underlined from early on 
the country’s commitment to a political project that 
goes beyond the mere notion of  a strong single 
market championed by successive governments in 
London. Membership of  the Euro is considered 
as non-negotiable by Ireland’s political classes, and 
even at the worst moment of  the economic failure, 
leaving the eurozone was never considered at either 
political or economic level, despite some com-
mentary that suggested that this would be an easier 
option and would allow devaluation.
A longstanding coalition, though circumscribed, has 
been Ireland’s relationship with France in virtually 
everything to do with the Common Agricultural 
Policy. This partnership has existed since Ireland 
joined the Common Market in 1973, and is care-
fully cultivated on both sides.
In the past years, Ireland’s reputation was severely 
damaged by the economic collapse of  2008 and 
the fact that Ireland was the first to need external 
eurozone help. The collapse was caused to a large 
extent by a property bubble, fuelled by an inad-
equately regulated banking sector. Real and con-
tinuing hardship was felt deeply in Irish society. It 
helped somewhat when it subsequently transpired 
that Ireland was not alone in needing support. Ire-
land moved first and hardest to introduce the kind 
of  measures to restore confidence in the economy 
– including, for example, a 30-percent reduction in 
public servant salaries. Today the country can bor-
row internationally at historically low interest rates. 
Now seen as the good pupil in the class, it will be 
the fastest growing economy in the eurozone in 
2015.
The past years have left scars in Ireland’s relation-
ship with the lead player in the eurozone – Ger-
many – because of  the nature of  the austerity 
program imposed on it. What was criticized in par-
ticular was Germany’s refusal to acknowledge the 
idea that the burden which Ireland took on itself  to 
support Irish banks at a critical moment did in fact 
help to maintain the credibility of  the whole Euro-
pean banking system. Germany’s refusal to allow 
any kind of  alternative financing of  the burden, 
which was carried by the Irish taxpayer, will remain 
a sore point in Ireland for some time. Nonetheless, 
although the role of  Germany has been well cov-
ered in the Irish media, public opinion seems to be 
shifting slightly. In the most recent (2012) opinion 
poll, which asked Irish citizens whether Germany 
was doing enough (or more than enough) to help 
the eurozone in its crisis, 64 percent of  those sur-
veyed said yes.
Following the Irish banking crisis, Ireland saw 
the institutions of  the EU as a stage on which to 
demonstrate that it had taken responsibility for the 
economic position in which it found itself  and to 
underline the traditional Irish orthodoxy for EU 
membership: Ireland should remain an “insider” 
while maintaining independence of  mind and 
action and in all cases fostering relationships with 
large neighbors – while at the same time seeking to 
avoid binary choices.43 Ireland’s Council presidency 
of  2013 was part of  that project. The approach of  
both officials and politicians was coherent enough 
to indicate that Ireland was still there, was still a 
member, and still had a voice.
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The eurozone crisis has had a significant impact on 
the political dynamics within the European Union. 
Old dividing lines between the EU’s member states 
have resurfaced, and new ones have appeared. 
Conversely, the past years have also witnessed the 
strengthening of  some traditional alliances and 
the formation of  new partnerships. However, at 
present neither the coalitions nor the divisions 
within the EU seem fixed. Instead, the situation 
is still evolving, with new events such as elections, 
changes in economic outlook, and external devel-
opments influencing the way in which the member 
states position themselves on the European stage.
The main objective of  this article is to look at the 
EU’s coalitions and divisions – both old and new – 
from the point of  view of  Finland, a member state 
located both geographically and politically in the 
northern part of  EU-Europe. We begin by briefly 
discussing Finland’s relations with other member 
states during the early period of  the country’s EU 
membership. We then analyze how and to what 
extent the eurozone crisis has changed the situation. 
Finally, we offer a short account of  the most recent 
developments in European coalition building, par-
ticularly in connection with the European elections 
in May 2014.
We suggest that even if  Finland has actively sought 
the inclusion of  “the North” into the EU’s political 
cartography and considers the EU’s other north-
ern member states to be an important reference 
group, the country has not aimed at building a 
strong northern alliance within the EU. Instead, 
Finland sees itself  as a constructive, pragmatic, and 
solution-oriented actor that is open to coopera-
tion with all member states. Correspondingly, Fin-
land has mostly preferred flexible, temporary, and 
issue-based partnerships to permanent coalition 
formations.
The eurozone crisis, however, poses a challenge to 
the Finnish approach to coalition building. First of  
all, the crisis has divided the EU’s member states 
into different and, at times, antagonistic groups. 
Building partnerships across the boundaries of  
these groups seems highly important, yet increas-
ingly difficult. Secondly, the crisis has invigorated 
the domestic discourse on EU issues in several 
member states. In the Finnish case, the heated 
domestic debates about the rescue loan programs 
have had a visible impact on the government’s EU 
policy and on the country’s position within the 
EU in general. Conscious of  the voters’ critical 
attitudes toward the rescue packages, the Finnish 
government has constantly highlighted the impor-
tance of  budgetary discipline and underlined that 
each member state is responsible for its sovereign 
debt. This approach has placed Finland firmly in 
the German-led group of  northern creditor states, 
thus complicating cooperation with some of  the 
southern EU members. Despite these trends, many 
signs point to Finland’s continued willingness to act 
as a bridge-builder in the EU and focus on issues 
instead of  coalitions.
Finland’s Role in Coalition Building before 
the Eurozone Crisis
Finland joined the EU in 1995 together with Aus-
tria and Sweden. It was Sweden’s decision to apply 
for EU membership that served as the final push 
for Finland’s EU candidature, as Finland and Swe-
den are closely linked economically and politically. 
The simultaneous accession of  Finland and Sweden 
to the EU opened up the possibility of  increased 
Nordic cooperation under the EU’s umbrella, as 
Denmark had been a member of  the EU since 
1973.44 However, although the three Nordic EU 
members seemed like natural partners, they have 
not formed a distinctive “Nordic bloc” within the 
EU.45 Instead, the cooperation between the three 
has been limited to certain issue areas.
The most prominent example of  Nordic coopera-
tion within the EU has been the concerted attempt 
of  Denmark, Finland, and Sweden to increase the 
transparency of  EU governance in the years after 
1995. Additionally, the social models of  the Nor-
dic EU member states have received considerable 
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attention within the Union as a whole. Famed for 
their social welfare systems and high level of  equal-
ity, the three countries have generally welcomed 
interest in their models. However, they have also 
underlined that social policy should continue to fall 
under national competence, even while acknowl-
edging the need for more EU coordination and 
joint benchmarks in this policy area.
Finland and Sweden have also worked together in 
the areas of  Common Foreign and Security Policy 
(CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy 
(CSDP). This cooperation has been facilitated by 
the two countries’ similar interests; both have been 
keen to demonstrate their commitment to CFSP/
CSDP and to emerge as providers of  European 
security. At the same time, they have been wary of  
compromising their status as militarily non-aligned 
countries.46 Denmark, by contrast, having opted 
out from CSDP, has put more emphasis on its 
longstanding relationships with the US and NATO 
(which it joined as a founding member in 1949).
With regard to the single market, all Nordic EU 
member states have been vocal proponents of  a 
liberal approach. As distinctively open and thor-
oughly globalized export-oriented economies, 
they have often found like-minded partners in 
the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, which 
hold similar views on the deepening of  the single 
market, furthering the EU’s external trade relations, 
and enhancing the Union’s competitiveness. This 
liberal northern view has been acknowledged and 
occasionally highlighted by both the countries in 
question and other member states.
The Nordic connection within the EU has, how-
ever, been weakened by the different pathways 
chosen by the Nordic EU members in terms of  
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Whereas 
Finland decided to join the final stage of  EMU and 
adopt the euro, Sweden (after a referendum) and 
Denmark (on the basis of  the opt-outs it negoti-
ated in the early 1990s) have kept their national 
currencies. For many, this has distinguished Sweden 
and Denmark as more cautious member states 
when compared to Finland, which has attempted 
to increase its influence by moving closer to the 
Union’s core.47
While its positive EMU decision made Finland 
the odd one out among the Nordic EU members, 
Finland attached more weight to the possible eco-
nomic gains as well as to the possibility of  having a 
say when important decisions concerning the EU’s 
future are made. This is indicative of  Finland’s 
general strategy within the EU. All in all, Finland’s 
membership period has been characterized by 
attempts to build a reputation as a proactive and 
constructive member state willing to find practi-
cal solutions to the key issues on the EU’s agenda. 
Accordingly, Finland has sought to cooperate with 
different member states on different issues, placing 
more weight on dealing with the issue at hand than 
on the choice of  the coalition partner. Moreover, 
Finland has underlined the role of  the European 
Commission, an institution that is legally bound 
to represent the EU as a whole. In so doing, it 
has often found itself  on the same side with other 
small and medium-sized member states, particularly 
in negotiations concerning major reforms to the 
EU treaties.
In its role as a pragmatic and solutions-oriented 
member state, Finland has also drawn inspiration 
from Germany, an early supporter of  the Finnish 
membership bid that has remained an important 
partner after Finnish EU accession. Germany has 
traditionally been viewed in Finland as a balancing 
element within the EU, building a bridge between 
the EU’s big and small member states as well as 
between the Union’s northern, southern, and east-
ern parts.48 Germany’s image did, however, suffer a 
blow during the early period of  the eurozone crisis, 
when the bilateral cooperation and coordination 
between Germany and France (“Merkozy”) raised 
fears in Finland and other small member states of  
increased big member state dominance in the EU.49
A good example of  how Finland perceives its role 
within the EU is the country’s first major EU initia-
tive, the Northern Dimension Initiative. The plan 
aimed to introduce a “Northern” component to 
a wide variety of  EU policies – including external 
relations, environmental policy, energy policy, and 
regional policy – and thus put “the North” on 
the EU’s political map. However, true to Finland’s 
inclusive approach to coalition building, the initia-
tive was from the very start designed to be open to 
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a large number of  actors, including the Baltic states 
– at the time still candidate countries – as well as 
to non-EU members such as Russia, Norway, and 
Iceland.
Finland’s Role in Coalition Building during 
and after the Eurozone Crisis
The eurozone crisis has in many ways posed a 
challenge to Finland’s inclusive and issue-based 
approach to coalition building. One of  the central 
consequences of  the crisis is that it has pitted EU 
member states against one another, deepening 
some existing (or perceived) divides between them 
– most notably the North/South or debtor/creditor 
cleavages – and creating new lines of  division such 
as the increasingly important boundary between 
eurozone countries and non-eurozone countries as 
well as the rift between the UK and the rest of  the 
EU.
Furthermore, Finland itself  has now been firmly 
anchored in the German-led group of  northern 
“creditor” countries as well as in the even more 
exclusive club of  the so-called AAA countries. 
A major factor behind this development is the 
increasing interplay between Finland’s domestic 
politics and the country’s EU policy. The rescue 
loans offered to crisis-stricken eurozone coun-
tries proved highly unpopular in Finland, and the 
national parliamentary elections of  April 2011 
saw the Euroskeptic (True) Finns Party establish 
itself  as Finland’s third-biggest party. Although 
the Finns Party did not join the government coali-
tion that was formed after the elections, the new 
government took the electorate’s message seriously, 
adopting a more cautious attitude toward further 
integration and above all toward any steps leading 
to greater joint liability among the eurozone mem-
ber states.50 In this context, Finland emerged as a 
staunch supporter of  tight fiscal consolidation.
Right after the 2011 parliamentary elections, some 
of  Finland’s positions proved too much even for 
the other AAA countries, leaving it to fight for its 
views alone. Finland was, for example, the only 
country to demand collaterals from Greece and 
Spain in exchange for Finnish participation in the 
rescue packages offered to those countries. Fin-
land’s readiness to act as a veto player demonstrates 
a visible break from its earlier, cooperative and 
solutions-oriented line.
This does not, however, mean that Finland would 
have abandoned its ideal of  being able to work 
with all EU member states. Aware of  its reputation 
in some southern member states, Finland has, for 
example, tried to perform damage control vis-à-vis 
the crisis countries, with former Prime Minister 
Jyrki Katainen often publicly expressing his sym-
pathy for these countries and comparing their situ-
ation to that faced by Finland in the early 1990s.51 
Katainen also visited several southern member 
states during the crisis in order to explain Finland’s 
views and positions.52 Furthermore, in a notable 
effort at cooperation across the North/South 
divide, Katainen and Italy’s former Prime Minis-
ter Enrico Letta published a joint commentary in 
Germany’s Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, demanding 
simpler EU legislation that would help promote 
economic activity and growth in Europe.53
Finland’s general apprehension about the emer-
gence of  new divisions within the EU has also 
manifested itself  in the country’s concern about 
the growing divide between eurozone and non-
eurozone countries, which threatens to distance 
Finland ever further from its Nordic (Sweden and 
Denmark) and northern (the UK) reference group. 
The Finnish government’s 2013 report on EU pol-
icy explicitly states that “no unnecessary gap must 
be allowed to develop between the eurozone and 
other member states,” underlining that “[d]ifferenti-
ated integration must primarily be realized within 
the EU structures in accordance with the common 
rules” in order to guarantee “that cooperation 
proceeds with open doors without excluding any 
Member States.”54
Despite the deepening of  the eurozone/non-
eurozone divide and the growing distance between 
some northern member states, even the crisis years 
have seen some attempts to highlight a distinctly 
“northern” view of  policymaking.55 The most nota-
ble initiative in this respect has undoubtedly been 
David Cameron’s idea to hold a UK-Nordic-Baltic 
summit in London in January 2011. The summit 
gathered altogether nine Northern European coun-
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tries (the United Kingdom, the three Baltic states, 
the three Nordic EU members as well as Iceland 
and Norway) and led to the creation of  an annual 
British-Nordic-Baltic reunion under the moniker 
Northern Future Forum.56
While the agenda of  the British-Nordic-Baltic sum-
mits has not been directly related to the EU, the 
UK’s interest in this forum is likely to be linked to 
its aim to find like-minded partners in Northern 
Europe in order to compensate for its increasing 
alienation from continental Europe. However, with 
the Euroskeptic domestic debate in the UK com-
pelling Cameron to steer his country ever further 
from the European mainstream and toward a pos-
sible British exit from the EU, the future of  the 
northern axis within the Union seems uncertain. In 
Finland, the UK’s dwindling interest in the EU is 
perceived as a very regrettable development.
On the other hand, the Baltic countries Estonia 
and Latvia have now both joined the eurozone – 
with Lithuania due to follow suit in January 2015. 
Their views on economic policies are rather similar 
to Finland’s. While the potential of  a more com-
prehensive Finnish-Baltic partnership has been 
taken note of  in Finland, finding practical forms of  
closer cooperation is still a “work in progress” at 
best. Interestingly, the ex-prime ministers of  Fin-
land, Estonia, and Latvia all act as vice-presidents 
of  the new European Commission, with Jyrki 
Katainen and Valdis Dombrovskis being respon-
sible for the closely related portfolios of  “Jobs, 
Growth, Investment & Competitiveness” and “the 
Euro & Social Dialogue,” respectively. This could 
possibly introduce new momentum into these 
states’ relations.
As for Finland’s future role in European coali-
tion building, it is likely that the country will carry 
forward on the path on which the eurozone crisis 
has placed it. This means that on the one hand, 
Finland will continue its close alignment with Ger-
many and the other northern “creditor” countries. 
On the other hand, the country will also try to 
engage in practical cooperation with other inter-
ested member states and work toward maintaining 
the unity of  the EU. Unlike in many other member 
states, the European Parliament elections of  May 
2014 were not a major game changer in Finland. 
The National Coalition Party of  outgoing Prime 
Minister Katainen and his successor, Alexander 
Stubb, maintained its position as Finland’s biggest 
party, whereas the Euroskeptic Finns Party received 
only 13 percent of  the votes. This gives the gov-
ernment’s current pragmatic pro-EU policy a solid 
domestic basis.
Of  course, the continuation of  the current policy 
is not carved in stone. Above all Finland’s own rap-
idly worsened economic outlook could influence 
how the country positions itself  in the European 
debates over the short or medium term. The next 
Finnish parliamentary elections are set to take 
place in April 2015 and could potentially influ-
ence Finland’s EU policy line as well. Similarly, the 
EU’s ongoing confrontation with Russia and the 
concomitant foreign policy debates at the national 
and the European level could affect the larger 
coalition building trends within the EU. The EU’s 
relationship with Russia has traditionally been a 
major bone of  contention among EU member 
states – particularly since the eastern enlargement 
in 2004 – and the discussions surrounding the eco-
nomic sanctions imposed on Russia have added a 
new dimension to the affair. It remains to be seen 
whether and how the dispute with Russia and the 
differences of  opinion between the member states 
will impact Finland’s previous attempts to foster 
consensus and occupy middle ground in the EU’s 
internal deliberations on EU-Russia relations.
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Coalitions of  political actors are and will continue 
to be a crucial factor in European Union policy-
making. Both the legislative competencies of  the 
European Parliament (EP) and the relevance of  
majority voting in the Council of  Ministers have 
significantly increased. There is barely any policy 
domain unaffected by the European level, so that 
parties, parliamentary groups, and governments 
face strong incentives to engage in effective coali-
tion building endeavors in order to pass the respec-
tive voting thresholds. In the ubiquitous theoretical 
and empirical studies concentrating on coalitions 
and coalition building in political research, sur-
prisingly little attention has been paid to these 
dynamics.
Theoretical and empirical insight into the logic, forma-
tion, and consequences of  legislative coalitions may 
be borrowed from studies of  national politics. The 
most influential theoretical contribution to the study 
of  national political coalitions was made by William 
Riker in 1962.57 Beginning with the assumption that 
any political actor is primarily interested in gaining 
political office, he applied formal modeling to show 
that politicians will form “minimum winning coali-
tions” just about large enough to gain control over a 
specific office, to maximize their share of  the office 
portfolio, and to get specific policy goals enacted. 
Riker’s models of  “opportunistic issue entrepreneurs” 
have since been criticized by other scholars who put 
more emphasis on the programmatic profiles of  
actors likely to engage in a coalition. An alternative 
explanation is that political actors only enter coali-
tions with partners that have compatible, overlapping 
policy preferences. Both of  these perspectives were 
later amalgamated into a third model: “minimum con-
nected winning coalitions.” This two-dimensional per-
spective implies that ideologically “neighboring” and 
programmatically compatible actors tend to en gage 
in minimum-winning coalitions.58 Alternatively, politi-
cal actors may prefer to form “oversized coalitions” 
when maintaining coalition bargains proves to be 
complicated, package deals are involved, or political 
matters tend to be symbolically laden.59
How valuable are such models for policymaking at 
the EU level? The Union’s legislative bodies, the 
European Parliament and the Council of  Ministers, 
do not (need to) support and sustain any kind of  
elected executive. One can therefore expect “coali-
tions” to be more ad hoc, more volatile, and more 
centered on specific issues and projects. But does 
this assumption still hold in the EU operating 
under the Lisbon Treaty?
This contribution sheds some light upon the 
dynamics of  legislative coalitions in European 
Union politics, which are driven and modified by 
the results of  the most recent EP elections of  May 
2014. In contrast, shifting dynamics of  coalition 
building in the Council of  Ministers are affected 
by the shift from the triple majority system (as 
defined by the Nice Treaty) to the double one (as 
defined by the Lisbon Treaty, which went into 
affect in November 2014). I will briefly discuss the 
composition and coherence of  legislative coalitions 
in both bodies and also present some tentative 
conclusions on the perspectives for legislative coali-
tions in the coming years.
Coalitions in the European Parliament
Political collaboration in the EP tends to be 
established along the respective ideological and 
programmatic lines of  the members of  parliament 
(MEPs) and fostered by the groups that most of  
them are part of.60 Research based on roll-call votes 
in the previous EPs has shown that parliamen-
tary voting is explained by ideological rather than 
national alignment. Scaling analyses performed on 
these data empirically underscore these findings. 
Table 1 displays cohesion scores of  the parlia-
mentary groups. With the notable exemption of  
the “Europe of  Freedom and Democracy” group 
(EFD), there was very high degree of  group cohe-
sion in the 7th European Parliament (2009–14). For 
the established, large, and centrist umbrellas such 
as the European People’s Party (EPP) or the Alli-
ance of  Socialists and Democrats (S&D), on aver-
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age about 90 percent of  the MEPs tend to be on 
the same side of  a vote. On the other hand, mem-
bers of  the EFD agreed in less than half  of  the 
parliamentary votes. Unsurprisingly, the right-wing 
euroskeptic platform lost most member factions 
after the 2014 EP elections and was subsequently 
renamed and reorganized. Ultimately, concerning 
the temporal dimension, the (increasing) coher-
ence of  political behavior within the EP factions 
is a consistent phenomenon that has also been 
illustrated by comparative analyses of  the previous 
EPs.61
Legislative coalitions of  course depend on the spe-
cifics of  the respective majority requirement in a 
given policy area. When a simple majority is needed 
to pass a motion, both the EPP and the S&D usu-
ally form a majority with some of  the EP’s more 
ideologically aligned smaller groups, in particular 
the Alliance of  Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) 
and the Greens. If, however, an absolute majority 
is required, it is very difficult to form a winning 
coalition without the votes of  the two large, cen-
trist factions in the EP. This does not imply that 
they always vote together but that it is impossible 
to form a winning coalition without either of  them, 
and often impossible to sustain a winning coali-
tion without them both. Table 1 also presents an 
empirical breakdown of  the inclusion of  the vari-
ous political groups in winning coalitions in the 7th 
European Parliament. The MEPs for large, centrist 
actors such as the EPP and the S&D tend to end 
up on the winning side most of  the time, while 
members of  smaller, ideologically more extreme 
groups are more frequently outvoted.
Another pattern that can be observed is that 
whenever the EP intends to establish or defend its 
powers vis-à-vis the Council of  Ministers or the 
European Commission, there tend to be oversized 
legislative coalitions.62 But with this notable exemp-
tion in mind, voting patterns in the EP so far more 
closely resemble those in national parliaments, 
with two political issue dimensions structuring the 
MEPs’ political behavior and coalition dynamics: 
the semantics of  left and right and, to a far lesser 
extent, the pro- and anti-integration preferences.
Of  course, one may speculate about the conse-
quences of  May 2014 EP elections for the emer-
gence of  legislative coalitions in the current, 8th 
European Parliament. Given the extraordinary 
share of  outspokenly euroskeptic MEPs (at least 
28 percent), one may expect an increasing salience 
of  European integration matters compared to the 
more general left-right ideological divide. While the 
large groups of  Christian and Social Democrats 
(the EPP and the S&D) will certainly continue 
to be the key actors at the center of  the political 
spectrum, their combined share of  mandates in 
the EP is now less than 55 per cent. In contrast, 
the growing number of  euroskeptic politicians and 
parliamentary groups will not have many options 
to express their preferences, will most often be out-
voted, and are not given any alternative to having a 
significant imprint on EU politics. That said, it still 
remains unclear whether excluding these groups 
will make the breeding ground for the euroskeptic 
camp even more fertile.
Table 1: Cohesion and Winning Coalitions in 
the 7th European Parliament
EP Group Cohesion Winning Coalition
1: GUE-NGL 79.37 % 51.93 %
2: Greens/EFA 94.68 % 66.92 %
3: S&D 91.54 % 83.51 %
4: ALDE/ADLE 88.40 % 86.55 %
5: EPP 92.63 % 90.02 %
6: ECR 86.65 % 55.74 %
7: EFD 48.59 % 52.38 %
Notes: GUE-NGL=European United Left–Nordic Green Left;  
Greens/EFA=The Greens–European Free Alliance; 
S&D=Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats;  
ALDE/ADLE=Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; 
EPP=European People’s Party;  
ECR=European Conservatives and Reformists;  
EFD=Europe of Freedom and Democracy 
Source: www .votewatch .eu
Coalitions in the Council of Ministers
For a number of  reasons it is much more compli-
cated to track and dissect coalition building in the 
Council of  Ministers. (For a behind-the-scenes look 
at Council decision-making, see Daniel Naurin’s 
detailed study.63) The EP consists of  a large num-
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ber of  MEPs whose behavior may be accounted 
for by models of  parliamentary voting. But the 
Council is a much smaller body, and decision-
making may better be understood with the help of  
models of  committee voting. Because the Council 
by and large convenes behind closed doors, even 
insiders can often only guess how a vote will pro-
ceed or speculate, for example, about the share of  
votes that are already resolved by the time of  the 
formal vote. In the literature, best guesses on the 
share of  Council votes that have been prearranged 
behind closed doors hover between 35 and 85 per-
cent of  legislation.64
As with the EP, however, specific majority require-
ments and changes in the thresholds for qualified 
majority voting (QMV) clearly influence the emer-
gence of  legislative coalitions in the Council. The 
rules of  the Nice Treaty implied that three criteria 
for QMV had to be met: (1.1) about 74 percent 
of  the weighted votes in the Council are required 
(1.2), these votes have to represent at least 62 per-
cent of  the EU’s population, and (1.3) they must 
come from a majority of  member states. As of  
November 2014, the Lisbon Treaty changes this 
system, reducing the triple to a double majority. 
QMV requirements will henceforth be met with 
(2.1) a majority of  member states (55 percent) (2.2) 
representing 65 percent of  EU citizens. Moreover, 
a blocking minority must have at least four member 
states. The shift from the “triple” to the “double” 
majority is likely to lead to different coordination 
patterns and, in turn, facilitate the formation of  
different winning coalitions. Formal analyses sug-
gest that the new provisions generate more effi-
ciency – that is, that the new Lisbon Treaty rules 
allow for quicker decisions and more expedient 
adoption of  legislative acts.65 Potentially, the most 
significant consequence of  the transition from the 
Nice to the Lisbon treaty provisions is the reduc-
tion in number of  member states needed to be part 
of  a successful legislative coalition. Thus the new 
provisions are supposed to induce the emergence 
of  more compact and “manageable” minimal win-
ning coalitions formed by and around the larger 
member states. The Lisbon Treaty provisions may 
therefore help to “speed up” decision-making in 
the Coun cil, but they also run the danger of  alien-
ating the governments of  outvoted member states.
Nevertheless, the literature has often contested 
whether formal voting rules matter at all. Also, 
under the new rules, a significant share of  legisla-
tive issues will continue to be coordinated and pre-
arranged ahead of  the Council meetings – and thus 
will be decided under (formal) unanimity. Some 
argue that consensus in the Council is fostered by a 
“culture of  consensus,” which raises concerns about 
compliance, vote trading, logrolling, or simply by 
an overall lack of  disagreement among the member 
states. Others reply that even formally unanimous 
Council votes are negotiated under “the shadow 
of  the vote,” which implicitly brings the voting 
weights and other institutional provisions of  QMV 
back into the equation. In addition, more formal 
analyses have demonstrated that the apparent con-
sensus emerges from the logic of  coalition build-
ing in the Council itself. If  matters are decided via 
QMV, individual member states engage in the for-
mation of  (blocking) coalitions, and if  the oppos-
ing coalitions manage to broker a compromise, this 
also yields consensus between member states.66 
In any case, the rules of  the vote have been and 
continue to be bitterly contested, and so there are 
sufficient reasons to think they matter and have an 
impact on policymaking in the EU.
Coalition building in the Council is also volatile, 
and there are no “natural” or long-term stable 
coalitions. That said, vote choice might be best 
conceptualized as having two dimensions of  
motives. The first dimension involves a more 
volatile component, structured by the ideological 
and programmatic alignments of  those who hold 
elected national office. The second dimension is 
the more or less constant underlying fabric of  
national economic features and interests, cultural 
alignments, and so forth that constrains these 
actors. The empirical literature has isolated a num-
ber of  historical and contemporary vote patterns 
that are often not compatible – and may even be 
contradictory. For instance, members of  the “his-
torical alliance” of  France, Germany, and often the 
Benelux countries, have frequently voted together 
over the past decades. On the other hand, geo-
graphic (and allegedly cultural) proximity clearly has 
an impact on the formation of  legislative coalitions, 
and small countries represent their joint interests 
in opposition to larger member states. In more 
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recent searches for a grand issue or division line 
that structures choices and political competition 
within the European Council of  the heads of  state 
or government, researchers often allude to a meta-
issue dividing northern and western member states 
from their southern and eastern counterparts.
Recent studies have shown, however, that allegedly 
stable patterns of  economic or “national” interests 
are often modified by the ideological perspectives 
of  the specific national governments represented in 
the Council. Far from static, the dividing lines are 
very likely to change when national elections lead 
to a change of  government. Electoral dynamics are 
thus also a key factor influencing decision-making 
and the capacity to act in the EU’s intergovernmen-
tal bodies.
Given that the Council tends to be pre-arranged 
and organized “under the shadow of  a vote” – and 
that member states are still inclined to find con-
sensus – country-specific evidence needs to be 
analyzed with both care and caution. That said, the 
examples in Figure 1 shed light on the congruence 
and differences in the voting behavior of  Austria, 
Germany, and the other member states. Taken 
together the voting patterns and coalition align-
ments of  both countries line up reasonably well. 
Both Austria and Germany tend to vote together 
with countries like Croatia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Luxembourg. Both tend to disagree 
more frequently with Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and the UK, and also with themselves. These 
findings illustrate that the historical integration 
coalition of  France, Germany and the Benelux 
countries has significantly eroded, with France 
only in the midfield and the Netherlands toward 
the end of  the field. Across the 28 EU member 
states, empirical analyses of  voting behavior in 
the 7th European Parliament illustrate that Britain 
and Germany were the two countries most often 
on different sides of  a vote (namely 16 percent of  
the formal votes). Disagreements between both 
partners were predominantly centered on issues 
of  constitutional affairs, foreign policy, agriculture, 
budget, and employment.
Perspectives
Below the line, the balance of  power in the EP 
and Council and the shifts in institutional com-
petencies facilitate the construction of  minimal 
winning coalitions in both bodies. Within the EP, 
these coalitions most likely need to include both 
the EPP and S&D. Formally, a coalition of  the 
social democrats with the “European United Left” 
(GUE–NGL) and the “Greens” would fall short 
of  a parliamentary majority. In contrast, the EPP 
could formally, but perhaps not programmatically, 
support a right-wing coalition with the smaller fac-
tions ECR, ALDE, and the Euroskeptic Europe of  
Freedom and Direct Democracy group (EFDD).
Within the Council, the new procedures of  the 
Lisbon Treaty that entered into force in Novem-
ber 2014 will increase the opportunities for larger 
member states to blank out the interests of  the 
smaller ones. Both the likely dominance of  the 
centrist coalition in the EP and the increasing 
weight of  the larger member states in the Council 
could help to further alienate not only the increas-
ing share of  euroskeptic voters whose views are 
not considered in the EP, but also of  some of  the 
more euroskeptic, medium-sized and small member 
states that may be marginalized in the intergovern-
mental pillar of  EU decision-making.
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Responding to the impact of  the financial, eco-
nomic, and political upheaval of  the EU, and 
the eurozone in particular, member states have 
returned center-stage in EU policymaking. This is 
hardly a surprising development in times of  crisis. 
As Yann-Sven Rittelmeyer reminded us in his chap-
ter, member states across Europe have gained both 
fame and blame over the past years. In an environ-
ment of  uncertainty, under time pressure, and with 
a lack of  instruments in place, the EU and its com-
mon currency would not be where they are today 
without the willingness of  national governments in 
the European Council to engage, lead, and forge 
agreement on joint responses.
Needless to say, the EU’s intergovernmental 
modus operandi in past years has also been widely 
criticized. The heavy focus on intergovernmental 
decision making behind the well-guarded doors of  
the European Council has given greater urgency 
than ever before to questions of  democratic 
legitimacy, transparency, and effectiveness of  EU 
policymaking.
Member states’ experiences of  both their potential 
and limitations in shaping EU policy turned out to 
be very diverse. European governments witnessed 
both intense moments of  power (Germany in 
particular) and powerlessness (most markedly, in 
the countries under the support and surveillance 
programs of  the EU and the International Mon-
etary Fund). Questions of  national power returned 
with force and have already left scars between EU 
capitals.
Ultimately, however, it is not the power of  member 
states that has so far saved the euro from breakup, 
but rather a policy change undertaken by the 
European Central Bank. While acknowledging the 
role that EU institutions other than the European 
Council and the Council of  Ministers played – and 
continue to play – in shaping the future of  the EU, 
we decided in this compilation to focus largely on 
the role and potential of  EU member states. How 
do member states respond to the changing nature 
of  the EU and the overall environment of  EU 
policymaking? To what extent do their role and 
patterns of  interaction differ from previous years? 
What brings them together, and what divides them? 
And finally, what does this all mean for the future 
of  member state interaction at such a formative 
time for the future of  the Union as a whole?
Interestingly, none of  the contributors fundamen-
tally questioned the role and potential of  member 
states in the EU context – while arguably, in one 
interpretation, what we see today is the last battle 
of  the EU’s nation states for their very existence. 
Member states continue to be reckoned with. But 
in what ways? Five major themes emerged in the 
papers.
1. The Overall Political Environment
Member state interaction is influenced by a politi-
cal environment that is strikingly different from its 
past iterations. The past years have brought about 
what Josef  Janning branded a “climate change 
in European integration,” which has led govern-
ments to break with traditions of  the past. Coali-
tion building among member states continues to 
play an important role but has emerged as more 
ad-hoc interaction alongside national approaches 
– a “horse-trading” exercise, as Katherine Meenan 
put it. “Given the proclaimed shared values of  
the Union,” she argues, “there did seem to be an 
emphasis on achievement, on moving forward. 
Now negotiations between member states appear 
to be based on the least each participant feels they 
can get away with.”
Trust between member states – the indispensable 
glue needed to bind EU members together espe-
cially when there are no rules and procedures in 
place – has suffered a great deal in the crisis, affect-
ing even long-standing and heavily institutionalized 
alliances such as the Franco-German coalition. Ire-
land, in its determination and commitment to over-
come the crisis in the very midst of  the EU/IMF 
program, is an example of  a country that managed 
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to recreate trust, suggesting that trust is not static 
but can be lost and won. In the current EU, how-
ever, the Irish example seems rather to be more the 
exception than the rule.
2. The Impact of Politicization
Many if  not all of  the papers reflect the new 
degree of  politicization that has started to signifi-
cantly affect the process and the substance as well 
as the opportunities and the limitations of  coali-
tion building. No longer can national governments 
simply go ahead at the European level to “do what 
needs doing.” More than ever, they have to keep 
their electorates engaged, and this can result in 
both constraints and opportunities for coalition 
building. In Germany, Angela Merkel managed to 
win the federal elections in September 2013 with 
a landslide victory for her conservative party. This 
strong electoral mandate cemented her clout in 
the ongoing debate over eurozone governance 
reform, but it has not translated into an ability to 
build the critical mass of  political support needed 
to organize the depth of  reform that a sustainable 
currency union needs. The main reason has been 
a growing asymmetry between Berlin and Paris. 
President François Hollande currently lacks the 
domestic support to reform the French economy, 
and pressure from the nationalist and xenophobic 
Front National party is growing both at home at 
in the newly elected EP. As a result, Paris is per-
ceived as too weak to play its traditional tandem 
role alongside Germany. According to this logic, 
France would have reconciled the “investment and 
growth” camp within the eurozone with the “aus-
terity camp” led by Germany, and vice versa. Yann-
Sven Rittelmeyer therefore argues that politicization 
has been detrimental to the functioning of  the old 
Franco-German coalition, damaging the vitality of  
the Union as a whole.
Katherine Meenan predicts that Euroskepticism 
across Europe will generally impair the likeli-
hood of  future joint endeavors of  member states. 
The Finnish case illustrates this point. Tuomas 
Iso-Markku and Juha Jokela describe how, under 
growing Euroskeptic pressure at home, the govern-
ment in Helsinki had to leave its comfort zone and 
adopt fundamental changes to its EU approach by 
becoming a singled-out veto player in the negotia-
tions over eurozone rescue packages.
The government of  Matteo Renzi in Italy, on the 
other hand, witnessed one of  the more empow-
ering effects of  politicization. A victory of  the 
prime minister’s party in the European Parliament 
elections brought Italy back into the core group 
of  shapers of  European integration. Now it puts 
pressure on Renzi to deliver results during Italy’s 
current Council presidency. Politics matter, and 
they have an impact on coalition building – but 
one that member states have yet to further explore. 
Will their ability to form coalitions ultimately be 
impaired, or will coalitions turn out to be simply 
more politicized, with a new political logic replac-
ing the “statecraft coalition logic” of  the past orga-
nized by diplomatic negotiators and government 
officials?
3. The Big Divisions
While politics increasingly matter, the question 
is: what are the main areas of  political division in 
today’s European Union? At first sight it looked 
like the more member states jointly decide over 
common goods, the more applicable the division 
between left and right to explaining coalition-
building patterns at the EU level. Yet things are not 
that simple. Roderick Parkes points out that “there 
cannot be clear political divisions between left 
and right … in a multi-vector polity like the Euro-
pean Union,” suggesting that the EU has perhaps 
become an even more complex animal to grasp. 
Guido Tiemann shares this more nuanced view in 
examining future coalitions in the European Parlia-
ment, wondering whether the increased clout of  
Euroskeptic parties in the 8th European Parliament 
will increasingly draw the lines between nationalist 
and Europeanist (or decentralized and centralized) 
views rather than along the left/right divide.
With regard to policy, the most prominent split 
is the one dividing the eurozone “ins” from the 
“outs.” While the current shape of  a “core Europe” 
is far from healthy and vibrant, it is clearly seen 
as the major game in town. Member state interac-
tion is increasingly shaped by a de facto position 
or aspiration of  a member state with regard to 
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the dynamics in the eurozone core. Paweł Tokar-
ski argues that traditional geographical coalitions 
such as between Poland (a non-Euro member) 
and Slovakia (a Euro member) have been recently 
re-shaped along this dividing line. Finland, the 
only eurozone member of  the Nordic countries, 
has compromised on its natural role as a bridge 
between the Nordics and the rest of  the EU. This 
has led the government in Helsinki to focus on 
content rather than on fixed alliances in order 
to avoid losing its partners in the EU’s northern 
dimension.
Quite naturally, EU member states both inside and 
outside of  the eurozone are trying to feed their 
preferences into the current round of  governance 
reform determining fundamental choices of  eco-
nomic and social policy. No doubt, the stakes have 
become higher, and member states are responding 
in different ways to this new political environment.
4. New Coalition Dynamics
The EU’s economic and political upheaval has 
also triggered new dynamics in coalition building. 
France and Italy started with new energy to engage 
with one another and a wider set of  (southern) 
EU members. Paweł Tokarski points out that it is 
not Germany’s strength and leadership – or lack 
thereof  – that will ultimately decide the future of  
economic and monetary union, but that of  France 
and Italy. He writes that “paradoxically, Renzi’s 
political strength in Brussels not only stems from 
the number of  his political supporters in Italy and 
abroad, but also from the scale of  the economic 
and social problems in his country – and his coun-
try’s systemic importance.” President Hollande in 
France has been suffering from a weakening of  
Paris in the old Franco-German alliance, which 
made him more open to exploring alternative 
(socialist) alliances. Both Rome and Paris know they 
are too big to fail, which gives them powerful lever-
age over the destiny of  the eurozone. Berlin started 
to react to this emerging alliance by bringing War-
saw into the Franco-German context through the 
Weimar Triangle, by attempting to join the emerg-
ing Franco-Italian entente, and by reaching out to 
Madrid. By January 2015 all of  the Baltic countries 
will have joined the eurozone, creating perhaps new 
opportunities for Finland, which had to reconsider 
its strategies as the only Nordic eurozone member. 
Will we see new coalition building around the Bal-
tic Sea? These are only a few examples to illustrate 
that there is, in short, a breath of  fresh air.
The question is whether the emerging constella-
tions will result in new coalitions willing and able 
to constructively shape EU reform. What if  these 
turn out to be too weak – or choose instead to 
water down or prevent substantive reform? The 
signs of  weakness of  France and the UK give par-
ticular reason for concern in this regard, as Stefano 
Milia writes. Roderick Parkes widens this view to 
the “Big-3,” that is Germany, the UK and France. 
In his interpretation, the cohesion of  these three 
countries sits at the heart of  European integration, 
which makes it a common good in its own right 
and one worth preserving. Therefore it should be 
a crucial field of  engagement. One way of  keep-
ing the Big-3 engaged in the EU, he suggests, is to 
incorporate their formats better into the workings 
of  the supranational EU – not an easy argument to 
make in continental Europe at this point in time.
Germany, then, finds itself  “probably in one of  
the most difficult positions it has been in since the 
early days of  the European project” (Rittelmeyer). 
German power – regardless of  its acknowledged 
volatility – has created an imbalance that under-
mined the crucial principle of  equality of  member 
states. Analysts have mostly focused on what Ger-
man power meant for other EU members over 
the past years, dissecting their strategies in dealing 
with Berlin. But what should Germany itself  do 
to respond to this imbalance? Rittelmeyer sug-
gests that Germany essentially has two choices if  it 
wants to avoid further burdening European coali-
tion dynamics. It could aspire to a role of  “neutral 
mediator,” for the time being – either by making 
itself  a part of  all coalitions or by avoiding engag-
ing in any. Obviously, this would create a tension 
with the more interest-driven approach Berlin has 
adopted over the past years. The more promising 
approach, he argues, would be for Germany to 
become a bridge between institutionalized and ad 
hoc coalitions co-existing in today’s Union.
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5. Building Coalitions – but to What End?
Our discussion took as its starting point the 
assumption that the Union needed further reform 
and that coalition of  member states willing to 
shape any such attempt were crucial. The question 
then is to what end member states should lead? 
Not surprisingly, there was no clear consensus on 
this question. Stefano Milia placed the Four Presi-
dents’ Report of  2012 at the heart of  any meaning-
ful attempt at leadership. In this reading, constitu-
tional engineering is back on the EU’s agenda. But 
which member states will be ready to face the task? 
And what role are the newly elected European 
Parliament and the Juncker Commission willing 
to play? Paweł Tokarski argues that, as much as it 
would be needed, a major reconstruction of  the 
euro area architecture has not been on the cards 
yet and will have to wait until the next eurozone 
crisis. Now, at the time of  drawing these conclu-
sions, it does feel as if  the Union might be headed 
again toward such state of  emergency rather soon. 
The question is how member states will react – and 
interact – once the pressure is back. Will they have 
learned from their past coalition building mistakes?
While the Four Presidents’ Report did indeed 
put the main pillars of  a sustainable economic 
and monetary union on the agenda, the ways and 
means to achieve them are likely to look different 
from how they looked in times of  treaty change 
organized by intergovernmental conferences 
throughout the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s. The 
EU of  today is no longer the one we once knew, 
but there is not yet clarity about the “nature of  the 
beast.” What EU membership will be about in the 
twenty-first century is in many ways still an open 
question (or a moving target) – and a question that 
will have different answers for different EU mem-
bers in the end.
Much of  the old predictability about the channels 
of  influence and power dynamics at work within 
the EU and between member states has been 
shaken up in recent years. It seems that member 
states are still exploring the nature of  this new 
Union and their role in it. In the coming months 
and years, however, it will be crucial for govern-
ments to make a genuine investment into under-
standing the Union – since those with a true grasp 
of  the game will find it easier to shape the out-
come of  the major reconstruction of  the European 
Union that is currently underway.
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